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A REGULATORY WAKE-UP CALL:
LESSONS FROM BP’S DEEPWATER
HORIZON DISASTER
REBECCA M. BRATSPIES *

“[R]eality must take precedence over public relations, for nature
cannot be fooled.” 1
“who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine.” 2

*
Professor, CUNY School of Law. This Article benefitted from a number of discussions, including
the Albany Law School’s “Big Oil Big Consequences” Symposium, the 2011 AALS “Deepwater
Horizon Hot Topics” Panel, and William & Mary Law School’s “Looking Beyond Deepwater
Horizon” Symposium. Special thanks to Hari Osofsky, Rena Steinzor, Joel Mintz, Alyson Flournoy,
Victor Flatt, Tracy Hester, and Dale Goble for valuable insights and suggestions, and to Emily
Shalcross for research assistance.
1
R.P. FEYNMAN, PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELIABILITY OF THE SHUTTLE, APP. F
TO REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
(1986), available at science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/AppendixF.txt. Feynman characterizes certain aspects of the NASA space shuttle design program as a
“process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards.” As we respond to the BP crisis,
which represents a combination of failed technology, failed private activity and failed regulatory
oversight, we would do well to take his caution, offered in the wake of the Challenger Explosion, to
ensure that regulators “deal in a world of reality in understanding technological weaknesses and
imperfections well enough to be actively trying to eliminate them. They must live in reality in
comparing the costs and utility . . . and they must be realistic in making contracts, in estimating
costs, and the difficulty of the projects.” Id.
2
E-mail from BP Engineer Bret Cocales four days before the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
writing about BP’s decision to use only six centralizers in finishing the Macondo well, rather than
the twenty-one centralizers recommended by Halliburton. Sharyl Attkisson, BP May Have Taken
Risks with Deepwater Horizon in Order to Save Money, Ignored Advice from Halliburton, CBS
NEWS.COM (June 14, 2010), www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/14/eveningnews/
main6582197.shtml.
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INTRODUCTION

When British Petroleum’s (BP) Macondo well blew out on April 21,
2010, it set the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on fire, killed eleven
workers, and created the nation’s single worst environmental disaster. 3 It
also ripped away the veneer of safety that had cloaked offshore drilling,
exposing the massive risks involved in drilling for offshore oil in very
deep water—risks government regulators and the public had been
persuaded to forget. 4 Yet, even as dead sea turtles, 5 contaminated
beaches, 6 and closed fisheries 7 transfixed the public, the seemingly

3

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June
15, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
4
On April 2, 2010, just weeks before the April 20 disaster, President Obama announced a
plan to open up large swaths of the U.S. coastline to offshore drilling. President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President on Energy Security at Andrews Air Force Base (Mar. 31, 2010). The
President justified this decision with the explanation that “[O]il rigs today generally don’t cause
spills. They are technologically very advanced.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
in a Discussion on Jobs and the Economy in Charlotte, North Carolina (Apr. 2, 2010), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-discussion-jobs-and-economy-charlottenorth-carolina. In hindsight, this decision reflected what Naomi Klein called “cosmic bad timing.”
See Naomi Klein, A Hole in the World, NATION, July 12, 2010, available at
www.thenation.com/article/36608/hole-world. Or, as Professor Oliver Houck wrote, “Both
statements are, of course, true. What we also know now is that when they are not true, they are
extremely not true.” Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There
Ought to Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 n.74 (2010).
5
For statistics on sea turtle deaths and other wildlife mortality, see DEEPWATER HORIZON
RESPONSE CONSOLIDATED FISH AND WILDLIFE COLLECTION REPORT (2010), available at
www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Consolidated%20Wildlife%20Table%201
10210.pdf. For details about the decision to relocate sea turtle nests in an attempt to save hatchlings,
see NOAA Fisher, Sea Turtles, Dolphins and Whales and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill,
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/health/oilspill.htm.
6
According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, there were more than 2200 beach
closings due to BP’s oil spill. See MARK DORFMAN & KIRSTEN SINCLAIR ROSSELOT, TESTING THE
WATERS: A GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY AT VACATION BEACHES 2 (2010), available at
www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ttw/ttw2010.pdf. That figure does not include closures that occurred
after July 2010. Even when the beaches were open, visitors stayed away in droves, devastating local
economies. In the hardest-hit state, Louisiana, there are 3086 miles of coastline still in need of
cleanup (including marshes and beaches), with an additional 1598 miles of beach targeted for
cleanup in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. See Mark Schleifstein, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
Continues to Foul 168 Miles of Louisiana Coastline, NOLA.COM (Dec. 30, 2010),
www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/12/gulf_of_mexico_oil_spill_conti.html.
The
economic losses stemming from beach closings are staggering.
7
NOAA FISHERIES SERVICE, DEEPWATER HORIZON/BP OIL SPILL: SIZE AND PERCENT
COVERAGE OF FISHING AREA CLOSURES DUE TO BP OIL SPILL, available at
sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm (citing key statistics related to fishery
closures). As of this writing, much of the Gulf has been reopened to fishing, and its products have
been declared safe for consumption. Memorandum from Erik Schwaab, Assistant Admin., Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv., NOAA, to Michael Taylor, Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., on
Re-Opening of Federal Waters (Grids C14-16, 18, 20, 23-25) Surround the Well Head of the Federal
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endless gallons of oil gushing into the Gulf (at a rate of at least 53,000
barrels, or more than two million gallons, per day) 8 offered a vivid
reminder that an “unimaginably rich and irresistible golden zone of
hydrocarbons” lay deep below the Gulf of Mexico. 9 Given the United
States’ dependence on fossil fuels, 10 and the current political climate, it
is only a matter of time until deepwater drilling recommences. Indeed,
seemingly sensible steps like President Obama’s decision to impose a
moratorium 11 on such drilling until it was known what went wrong and
how to prevent a recurrence were met with blistering legal and political
attack. 12

Closed Area Due to the Deepwater Horizon MC 252 Oil Spill (Nov. 15, 2010), available at
sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/Nov15_FDA_Memo.pdf. Despite this official position,
harm to wildlife and the fishing industry that depends on it continues to be documented. For
example, in late November 2010, a portion of the Gulf that had been reopened for shrimping had to
be closed because shrimpers were finding tar balls in their nets. Jamie Burch, NOAA Closes 4200
Square Miles to Royal Red Shrimping, WKRG.com (Nov. 24, 2010), www.wkrg.com/gulf_oil_spill/
article/noaa-closes-4200-square-miles-to-royal-red-shrimping1/1202852/Nov-24-2010_7-08-pm/. It
was again reopened in early February 2011.
8
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/
03spill.html?_r=1&fta=y.
9
Jonathan Tilove, Oil Spill Commission Report Could Shape Industry’s Future, NOLA.COM
(Jan. 10, 2011), www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/01/
oil_spill_commission_report_co.html.
10
The U.S. government projects that oil and natural gas will continue to provide more than
75% of total U.S. and global energy needs until 2035 and beyond. Press Release, Energy Info.
Admin., EIA Energy Outlook Projects Moderate Growth in U.S. Energy Consumption, Greater Use
of Renewables, and Reduced Oil and Natural Gas Imports (Dec. 14, 2009), available at
www.eia.doe.gov/neic/press/press334.html. This point is particularly troubling because the Energy
Information Administration projects that world energy consumption will grow nearly 50% between
2007 and 2035. See International Energy Outlook 2010, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2010),
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html. If that projection is accurate, the world will need to push into
ever-more risky regions, and emit ever-increasing amounts of carbon dioxide into our alreadywarming atmosphere, in the scramble to meet this demand.
11
Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, to Michael R. Bromwich,
Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement, regarding the suspension of
certain offshore permitting and drilling activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (July 12, 2010),
available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&PageID=38375.
12
See, e.g., Judge Rules Against Deepwater Drilling Ban, CBN NEWS (June 22, 2010),
www.cbn.com/cbnnews/politics/2010/June/Oil-Industry-Execs-Criticize-Drilling-Ban/ (quoting an
industry advocate as characterizing the ban as “a knee-jerk” reaction); Joe Holley, Deep-Water
Drilling Ban Will Face House Test, HOUSTON CHRON., June 13, 2010, available at
www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/deepwaterhorizon/7049901.html (quoting Rep. Olsen as
characterizing the moratorium as a “knee-jerk reaction” that would wind up “turning a tragedy into a
nightmare”); Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal called the moratorium “ill-advised,” “cynical,” and
“arbitrary.” Bobby Jindal, Ban on Deepwater Drilling Adds Insult to Injury, WASH. POST, July 16,
2010, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/
AR2010071605180_pf.html. Conservative and oil industry bloggers routinely used similar
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The window for change may be small, but perhaps Congress and the
regulators will muster the political will to resist continuing pressures to
simply “drill, baby, drill,” 13 and will instead improve oversight of
offshore drilling. The moment for change is now—the disaster is still
fresh in the public’s mind, oil companies are posting record profits, and
the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Spill and Offshore
Drilling 14 has issued its report. 15 All the necessary tools are in hand.
The National Commission Report is the obvious starting place. The
Report delved into some key questions relating to the spill. It sought to
identify and understand BP’s poor choices in the days leading up to the
spill. 16 It then tried to evaluate those decisions against the technological
backdrop, in which deepwater oil extraction technology had progressed
far beyond disaster prevention and mitigation technology. 17 If there are
lessons to be learned from this disaster, this is the right approach.
Learning from this disaster means understanding why extraction
technology innovations flourished while cleanup and prevention
technologies stagnated. Only then can we fruitfully identify the kinds of
changes to the governance regime that might prevent this sort of tragedy
going forward.
In learning from the BP disaster, there are two levels at which to
understand what happened, and two kinds of lessons to draw:
straightforward and complex. The straightforward lesson focuses on BP
as a distinct entity, emphasizing the company’s culpability for its poor
decisions. 18 The complex lesson does not deny BP’s culpability but seeks
characterizations. See, e.g., Sherry Mowery, Obama the Destroyer: Drilling Ban Devastates Gulf
Economy (July 20, 2010), www.sodahead.com/united-states/obama-the-destroyer-drilling-bandevastates-gulf-coast-economy/blog-380737/; Peter C. Maffitt, Obama Ban of Offshore Drilling
PEACE
(Dec.
5,
2010,
2:23
PM),
Undermining
Our
Country,
BIG
bigpeace.com/pmaffitt/2010/12/05/obama-ban-of-offshore-oil-drilling-undermining-our-country/;
Obama’s Drilling Plan Piles Billions On Federal Debt, IMPEACH OBAMA CAMPAIGN.COM (Jan. 17,
2011), www.impeachobamacampaign.com/obamas-drilling-ban-piles-billions-on-federal-debt/.
13
This chant from the 2008 Republican National Convention became a campaign slogan for
the failed presidential bid of Republican John McCain and his running mate Sarah Palin. Jeffrey
Ball, Palin’s Policy: Drill. Baby, Drill, ENVIRONMENTAL CAPITAL, WSJ BLOGS (Sept. 4, 2008, 8:26
AM), available at blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/09/04/palins-policy-drill-baby-drill/.
14
President Obama created the Commission on May 21, 2010. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75
Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010).
15
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING (Jan. 11, 2011), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report [hereinafter NAT’L
COMM’N REPORT].
16
Id. at pts. I, II.
17
Id.
18
Although BP’s culture of risk is the focus of this Article, Hari Osofsky rightly points out
that BP had a host of corporate partners that participated in the well and may share some of the
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to situate BP’s private actions within a broader regulatory context in
order to identify systemic failures that contributed to the disaster.
This Article delves into both sets of lessons, concentrating more on
the “complex” explanation, which involves recognizing gaps in the
statutory scheme and conflicts in agency incentives. Part II begins with a
retrospective of the scope and scale of the worst environmental crisis in
U.S. history. It then explores the simple explanation for the disaster,
situating BP’s environmental and safety record against industry norms
and practices, and contrasting BP’s actions with the corporate ethos
described in their “beyond petroleum” ad campaign.
Part III focuses on the complex explanation, identifying some of the
regulatory dysfunctions that contributed to the disaster. While
acknowledging that poor private decisionmaking was the central and
primary cause of the Macondo blowout, this Part focuses on the
regulatory and institutional structures that allowed the situation to unfold
and details the points at which different regulatory choices might have
fruitfully constrained or redirected private activities. It sketches out a
widespread regulatory failure. In particular, this Part focuses on the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) permitting process, and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental analyses that
are supposed to be required by that process. It details how structural
aspects of the OCSLA, as well as cultural norms within the agency and
regulated community, virtually assured that these processes would
dwindle into mere paper-pushing exercises. Further, it suggests that these
flaws had been obvious to critics for some time, in many ways making
BP’s Gulf oil spill a wholly predictable disaster.
Having connected the dots between the various statutory and
regulatory regimes that should have prevented this disaster, Part IV of
the Article takes a more meta-perspective in order to identify some
overarching structural inadequacies in regulatory oversight of private risk
management decisions. It focuses on an often-overlooked aspect of the
regulatory capture problem—the implicit privatization that occurs when
an industry’s voluntary standards are adopted as regulatory standards.
Finally, the Article ends by drawing some lessons for developing better
regulation going forward, both for offshore drilling and environmental
assessment more generally.

blame. See Hari M. Osofsky, Multi-Dimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, at 9-11 (2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1760449.
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THE SIMPLE EXPLANATION: BP AS BAD ACTOR

A.

BACKGROUND

[Vol. 5

Until it was reconstituted as the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the wake of
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 19 the Minerals Management Service
(MMS) regulated the development of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil
and natural gas resources. 20 The agency was responsible for supervising
all exploration and extraction of gas and mineral resources on federal
lands, including offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. 21 For
convenience, this Article will refer to the agency as MMS throughout.
The Gulf of Mexico produces a quarter of the total U.S. oil
production, or roughly 500 million barrels of oil per year. 22 Deepwater
oil production (depths of 1000 feet or more) 23 began in the Gulf of
Mexico in 1979 with Shell’s Cognac Field located in 1014 feet of water,
then a record depth. 24 By 1983, Exxon, Conoco, and Unocal also had
deepwater production wells in the Gulf of Mexico. 25 As deepwater
production expanded, technology for exploring even-deeper waters

19

U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, CHANGE OF THE NAME OF
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
REGULATION
AND
ENFORCEMENT
(June
18,
2010),
available
at
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872.
20
Because MMS was the agency that made the key decisions in the years, months and days
leading up to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, this Article uses the term MMS, rather than its
successor agency BOEMRE. The only exception is that decisions or documents actually made by
BOEMRE after its creation are duly noted as such.
21
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three
Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/SalazarDivides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm.
22
Gulf of Mexico and overall U.S. production figures available from BOEMRE, Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Production, www.boemre.gov/stats/OCSproduction.htm (last
visited June 27, 2011).
23
MMS defined deep water for purposes of drilling as water depths greater than or equal to
1,000 ft, and ultra-deep water as water depths greater than or equal to 5,000 ft (1,524 m). See
LESLEY D. NIXON ET AL., DEEPWATER GULF OF MEXICO 2009, OCS REPORT MMS 2009-016 at 9
(May 2009), available at www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2009/2009-016.pdf. BOEMRE now treats
any well deeper that 500 feet as a deepwater well. See BOEMRE, Status of Drilling Permits Subject
to Enhanced Safety and Environmental Requirements in the Gulf of Mexico,
www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/well_permits.html (last visited June 27, 2011).
24
NIXON ET AL, supra note 23, at 10; see also Shell Confirms Presence of Hydrocarbons in
Deimos Prospect, ALEXANDER’S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS (Oct. 30, 2002),
www.gasandoil.com/goc/discover/dix24452.htm.
25
NIXON ET AL, supra note 23, at 10; Mike Forrest, “Bright” Investments Paid Off,
EXPLORER (July 2000), www.aapg.org/explorer/wildcat/2000/wildcat07.cfm.
THE
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continued to advance rapidly. Production from deepwater wells soon
outstripped oil production from shallow water wells. 26 Then, in 1986,
Shell made the first discovery of oil in the Gulf of Mexico in ultra-deep
waters (depths greater than 5000 feet (1524 meters)). 27 Since that time,
there have been many additional discoveries in the ultra-deep provinces
of the Gulf. 28 By 2008, the vast majority of MMS lease sales 29 were in
ultra-deep water, 30 and of the 7300 active Gulf leases, over half were in
deep water, with sixty-four at depths greater than 5000 feet. 31 By the
time that the Macondo well blew out on April 20, 2010, the twenty
highest producing areas of the Gulf were located in deep water, and
deepwater wells were responsible for about 80% of the oil produced in
the Gulf of Mexico. 32
All of the major oil companies have a stake in the deep waters of the
Gulf of Mexico: Shell operates six major offshore facilities and thirteen
manned platforms; 33 Chevron has significant deepwater production from
its Tahiti and Blind Faith fields; 34 and Exxon has numerous deepwater
wells, particularly in its Hoover/Diana field. 35
But it was BP that made the biggest investment in deepwater
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and around the world. BP is currently the
largest leaseholder in the Gulf of Mexico, with stakes in numerous

26

See, e.g., Toni Johnson, Deepwater Drilling’s Future, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
www.cfr.org/united-states/us-deepwater-drillings-future/p22204 (last updated Jan. 11, 2011) (citing
MMS statistics).
27
SHELL OIL CO., Mensa Subsea Development, www.shell.us/home/content/usa/aboutshell/
projects_locations/gulf_of_mexico/offshore_shell/operations/mensa_0308.html (last visited June 27,
2011).
28
See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 44-47.
29
“Lease sale” is the term of art used to refer to both mineral leases on federal lands and the
process of selling those leases; interested parties can propose tracts to be included in the scope of a
lease sale. The tracts themselves are auctioned off in a fairly complex bidding process. The details of
the lease sale process are available on the BOEMRE website, www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/
lsesale/lsesale.html.
30
NIXON ET AL., supra note 23, at xi.
31
CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3, 9 (July 30, 2010), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf.
32
Id.
33
SHELL OIL CO., Shell in the Gulf of Mexico, www.shell.us/home/content/usa/aboutshell/
projects_locations/gulf_of_mexico/ (last visited June 27, 2011).
34
Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Announces First Production from Tahiti Field in Gulf of
Mexico (May 6, 2009), available at www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-05-06.
35
Exxon Says Selling Some Shallow Gulf Assets, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2010),
www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/05/exxon-gulf-idUSN0522106320101005 (providing statistics);
Exxon Announces Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Discovery, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 10, 1999),
www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/73891&EDATE.
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deepwater fields. 36 For example, in 2001 BP and Chevron announced
that they had struck oil beneath 7000 feet of water and 20,000 feet of
sand in the Mississippi Canyon 696. 37 The resulting well, dubbed Blind
Faith, began production in 2008. 38
BP’s 1999 Thunder Horse discovery created huge excitement
because the Gulf of Mexico site was projected to contain a billion barrels
of reserves. 39 However, development at BP’s Thunder Horse site was
plagued with accidents and near-misses. For example, BP narrowly
avoided a blowout in 2003 when a riser pipe connecting the well to the
drilling rig snapped. 40 The blowout preventer saved the day, shearing the
pipe and shutting down the well. 41 Another near-disaster occurred in
2005 after Hurricane Dennis, when the drilling platform unexpectedly
began listing twenty degrees, bringing the lower deck to sea level. 42
It was not until 2008 that the first gallon of oil was produced from
Thunder Horse. 43 In its 2009 Annual Report, BP triumphantly announced
that production from Thunder Horse had exceeded 300,000 barrels per
day, making it the single largest producer in the Gulf of Mexico. 44 At
$90 a barrel (the price as of this writing), that is nearly $34 billion per
month. In addition to Thunder Horse, BP has numerous other Gulf of
36

Press Release, BP, BP Thunder Horse Production Ramping Up (Dec. 18, 2008), available
at www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7049859.
37
See Press Release, Chevron, ChevronTexaco Makes Acquisition in Deepwater Gulf of
Mexico (Oct. 30, 2003), www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/
article/10302003_chevrontexacomakesacquisitionindeepwatergulfofmexico.news; see also John
Collins Rudolf, On a Wing and a Prayer: Chevron’s Deep Well, N.Y. TIMES GREEN (June 17, 2010,
3:05 PM), green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/on-a-wing-and-a-prayer-chevrons-deep-well/.
38
Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Announces First Oil from Blind Faith Field in Gulf of
Mexico (Nov. 12, 2008), www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/
11122008_ChevronAnnouncesFirstOilFromBlindFaithFieldinGulfofMexico.news.
39
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 49; JOHN K. WARREN, EVAPORITES:
SEDIMENT, RESOURCES AND HYDROCARBONS 774 (2006).
40
PETER LEHNER & BOB DEANS, IN DEEP WATER: THE ANATOMY OF A DISASTER, THE FATE
OF THE GULF, AND HOW TO END OUR OIL ADDICTION 70 (2010).
41
CJ BEEGLE-KRAUSE & WALTON (TAD) LYNCH, SR., COMBINING MODELING WITH
RESPONSE IN POTENTIAL DEEP WELL BLOWOUT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THUNDER HORSE
(2005), available at response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/1287_Thunder%20Horse.pdf.
42
Press Release, BP, BP Assessing Damage to Thunder Horse Platform in Gulf of Mexico
(July 12, 2005), available at www.bp.com/extendedgenericarticle.do?
categoryId=2012968&contentId=7007227. For photos of the listing platform, see Martin Leduc, BP
Thunderhorse: Engineering Marvel on the Brink of Disaster, July 2005, DIESELDUCK.NET (Aug.
2006), www.dieselduck.ca/images/thunderhorse/index.htm.
43
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 50; see also STANLEY REED & ALISON
FITZGERALD, IN TOO DEEP: BP AND THE DRILLING RACE THAT TOOK IT DOWN (2011).
44
BP 2009 ANNUAL REVIEW: OPERATING AT THE ENERGY FRONTIERS 4 (2010), available at
www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/STAGING/common_asse
ts/downloads/pdf/BP_Annual_Review_2009.pdf.
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Mexico Drilling projects. 45 Overall, BP produces 400,000 million barrels
of oil a day from the Gulf of Mexico, 46 about a quarter of the Gulf’s
entire daily production, 47 and about 10% of BP’s total daily global
output. 48
In the fall of 2009, BP again generated excitement when it
announced a new find—this time in the Tiber field, with estimates
ranging up to 3 billion gallons of oil. 49 The Tiber well was drilled in
4132 feet of water and reached a depth of almost 31,000 feet beneath the
seafloor. 50 The drilling rig was Deepwater Horizon, the same rig that
worked on the ill-fated Macondo well. 51
Drilling for oil in deep and ultra-deep water is a challenging
technical feat. Getting equipment to the cold, dark seabed, under
thousands of feet of water, is only the beginning. The operator must then
drill tens of thousands of feet below the sea bed to reach the oil, which is
located in geological formations that may not be very stable. 52 The oil is
typically hot, up to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, and under very high
pressure. The temperature and pressure differentials between the oil and
the water put a tremendous strain on the drilling equipment. The operator
must manage all these complexities while also keeping the floating
drilling rig, which is on the water surface thousands of feet above the
drill site, stable in seas that can be quite rough.
45

According to a 2008 press release, these projects include Atlantis North Flank, Tubular
Bells, Isabela, Greater Puma, Dorado, King South, Great White, and the Ursa/Princess waterflood.
BP is also appraising its significant discoveries at Kaskida and Kodiak and recently announced a
significant discovery at its Freedom Prospect. Press Release, BP, BP Thunder Horse Production
Ramping Up (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?
categoryId=2012968&contentId=7049859.
46
BP 2009 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 44, at 14.
47
Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 29, 2010),
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm.
48
Steve Goldstein, BP Swings to Profit on Oil Price Rise, Cost Cuts, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 2, 2010), available at www.marketwatch.com/story/bp-swings-to-profit-onoil-price-rise-cost-cuts-2010-02-02?dist=WSJfeed&siteid=WSJ.
49
Joe Carroll, BP’s Tiber Find May Signal Oil Revival in U.S. Gulf of Mexico, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 2, 2009), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNrwOK1CUmMA; Press
Release, BP, BP Announces Giant Oil Discovery in the Gulf of Mexico (Sept. 2, 2009), available at
www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7055818.
50
Press Release, BP, BP Announces Giant Oil Discovery in the Gulf of Mexico (Sept. 2,
2009), available at www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7055818.
51
Usually oil exploration sites have names that evoke power, heroism or machismo. Perhaps
BP attracted the evil eye by naming its well after the town destined to be destroyed in Gabriel Garcia
Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967).
52
For a description of these complexities, see Joao Lima & Fred Pals, BP’s Tiber Find
Underscores Challenges of Deepwater Exploration, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2009),
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ak0cLK9YuS1E; see also NAT’L COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 15, at 21-53.
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THE DISASTER UNFOLDS

BP initially began drilling the Macondo well on October 7, 2009,
with a rig called the Marianas. However, in November of 2009,
Hurricane Ida damaged the Marianas, and drilling was stopped until the
rig could be replaced. 53 It was not until February 2010 that drilling
recommenced with the Deepwater Horizon. 54 The cost of leasing the
Deepwater Horizon rig from Transocean was approximately $500,000
per day. 55 BP targeted drilling the well to take fifty-one days and cost
approximately $96 million. 56 Drilling took considerably longer than
anticipated. By April 20, 2010, the day of the disaster, BP and the
Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than
$58 million over budget. 57 With the Deepwater Horizon rig late for its
next drilling location, delay was costing BP tens of millions of dollars in
leasing fees alone. 58 The time, pressure, and cost overruns formed the
backdrop against which BP made a series of fateful decisions in the days
and hours before the blowout.
On April 16, 2010, BP staff and Schlumberger, an oilfield service
provider acting as consultant on the well, recommended that BP triple the
number of stabilizers in the well in order to avoid “a severe gas flow
potential.” 59 Noting that the design change would take ten hours, BP
Team Leader, John Guide, overruled the recommendation. 60 The well
was completed without the additional stabilizers. BP finished cementing
the well on April 20. 61 Despite having flown a Schlumberger crew out to
the rig to perform a cement bond log test, BP opted to send them back

53

NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico--Special Report, GULF OIL & GAS,
www.gulfoilandgas.com/webpro1/projects/3dreport.asp?id=102868 (last visited June 27, 2011).
55
BP’s contract with Transocean specified that the daily rate would range from $458,000 in
March 2008 to $517,000 in September 2010. See Transocean Fleet Update n.11, TRANSOCEAN
(Apr. 13, 2010), available at www.deepwater.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/fleetupdate/2010/RIGFLTAPR-2010.pdf?FileName=RIGFLT-APR-2010.pdf.
56
BP, GOM EXPLORATION WELLS MC 252 #1--MACONDO PROSPECT WELL INFORMATION
(Sept. 2009), available at democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/
Macondo.Prospect.Well.Information.pdf.
57
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
58
HOUSE OF COMMONS, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER
DRILLING: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL 45 (2010).
59
Joe Carroll & Edward Klump, BP Engineer May Shed Light on Gulf Spill as Decision Is
Probed, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-27/bp-engineer-mayshed-light-on-gulf-spill-as-john-s-decision-is-probed.html.
60
Id.
61
Id.
54
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and forgo the tests, thereby saving $128,000. 62
Choices by the rig owner, Transocean, further compounded the risk.
For at least a year, Transocean had been disabling critical warning and
safety systems intended to detect gas leaks and prevent explosions, on
the grounds that “false alarms” would wake up workers. 63 Transocean
also elected to bypass a key system on the blowout preventer control
panel that might have prevented the explosion by cutting off spark
sources once gas got in the drill stack. 64 Five weeks before the disaster a
Transocean engineer reported seeing damage to the blowout preventer, 65
a critical piece of safety equipment that was the rig’s last line of defense
against catastrophic failure. 66 Despite having made extensive
representations to regulators about the critical safety role of blowout
preventers in preventing major spills, 67 BP apparently either did not
know or did not care about the damage.
On the day of the explosion, a negative pressure test—a test
intended to make sure no gas or oil was seeping into the well—indicated
that the well was not properly sealed. 68 Running the test two more times
yielded similar results. 69 Instead of believing the results and taking
appropriate steps, the team decided to run the test again. When the test
was run for a fourth time, it registered the result the team had been
looking for. 70 Rather than try to reconcile the contradictory information,

62

Testimony of John Guide, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation
Team
(C-Span
television
broadcast,
July
22,
2010),
available
at
www.cspanvideo.org/program/294696-2.
63
Testimony of Mike Williams, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Join Investigation
Team,
(C-Span
television
broadcast,
July
23,
2010), available
at
www.cspanvideo.org/program/294728-1; see also David Hammer, Deepwater Horizon Safety Alerts Were
Bypassed to Avoid False Alarms, Witness Says, NOLA.COM (July 23, 2010),
www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/deepwater_horizon_safety_alert.html.
64
Hammer, supra note 63 (quoting Chief Electronics technician Mike Williams that he had
been told Transocean rigs always used this bypass).
65
Id.; see also 60 Minutes, Blowout: The Deepwater Horizon Disaster (CBS television
broadcast May 16, 2010), available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/16/60minutes/
main6490197.shtml (Scott Pelley interviewing Mike Williams).
66
Carl Franzen, Oil Spill Points to Rig Fail-Safe as Utter Failure, AOLNEWS (Apr. 30,
2010), www.aolnews.com/2010/04/30/oil-spill-debacle-points-to-rig-fail-safe-as-utter-failure/. For a
video explaining blow-out preventers and what they are intended to do, see Video: Gulf of Mexico
Oil Spill--Blow Out Preventer, www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vCIadA62m0 (uploaded May 10,
2010).
67
See infra Part II.
68
Peter Elkin, David Whitford, & Doris Burke, BP: “An Accident Waiting to Happen,”
CNNMONEY (Jan. 24, 2011, 5:00 AM ET), features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/24/bp-anaccident-waiting-to-happen/.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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the team accepted the last set of results and deemed the test
satisfactory—a consequence, perhaps, of the fact that BP had no standard
procedures for running the tests or for interpreting the results. 71 Hours
later, hydrocarbons entered the well-bore, a gas leak ignited, the blowout
preventer failed, and the rig exploded. 72 The blowout preventer on the
Deepwater Horizon had not been properly certified, despite the clear
legal obligation of BP as the lessee to do so. 73 In its own assessment of
the accident, BP concluded that “a complex and interlinked series of
mechanical failures, human judgment, engineering design, operational
implementation, and team interfaces came together to allow the initiation
and escalation of the accident.” 74
C.

STOPPING THE LEAK

When the Macondo well blew out, BP had no plan for how to stop
the flow of oil from the well and no equipment with which to do it.
Indeed, it took BP months to construct the equipment that it ultimately
used to stem the flow of oil. 75 The entire country could do little more
71

Id.
See DET NORSKE VERITAS, FINAL REPORT FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR: FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF DEEPWATER HORIZON BLOWOUT PREVENTER (Mar 20,
2011), available at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047291/1/
DNV%20Report%20EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%20Volume%20I.pdf; see also NAT’L
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 6-10.
73
Key Device in BP Disaster Wasn’t Recertified, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 25, 2010), available at
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38855355/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/.
74
BP, DEEPWATER HORIZON ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 11 (Sept. 2010), available at
www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf. This report was
widely criticized for attempting to shift culpability away from BP. Pages 22-29 of the report provide
a useful chronology of the days leading up to the disaster.
75
BP spent weeks building a four-story-tall containment dome, which failed to contain the
oil gushing from the damaged well. Maev Kennedy, Gulf Oil Spill: Quick Fix Dashed as BP Tower
(May
9,
2010),
available
at
Fails
to
Contain
Oil,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/09/bp-oil-spill-tower-fails. The company then tried
again, with a smaller version of the containment dome, a device dubbed “top hat,” which was also
intended to cap the well. Kevin Grandia, BP Officially Ditches “Operation Top Hat,” Moves to
Insertion Tube to Stop Oil Spill, HUFFPOST GREEN (May 14, 2010, 8:09 PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-grandia/bp-officially-ditches-ope_b_577210.html. When that device
failed, BP attempted a procedure called “top kill,” which also failed. Jason Hanna, How BP’s “Top
Kill” Procedure Will Work, CNN U.S. (May 24, 2010), articles.cnn.com/2010-0524/us/faq.top.kill.bp_1_drilling-mud-blowout-oil?_s=PM:US. Leslie Kaufman & Clifford Kraus, BP
Prepares to Take New Tack on Leak as “Top Kill” Fails, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2010), available at
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/us/30spill.html. It took until July 15, 2010, for BP to successfully
deploy a containment cap that stopped the flow of oil into the Gulf. Suzanne Goldenberg, BP Stops
Oil Leak in Gulf of Mexico for First Time Since April, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 16, 2010),
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/16/bp-oil-spill-leak-stopped. On September 19, Admiral
72
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than watch as more than two million gallons of oil a day 76 —an Exxon
Valdez spill every four days 77 —gushed into one of the most diverse and
productive fisheries in the world.
During the eighty-seven days it took BP to finally stop the leak,
over 4.9 million barrels of crude oil (200 million gallons) gushed into the
Gulf of Mexico. 78 At one point, a third of the American portion of the
Gulf of Mexico was closed to fishing. 79 The spill was not only the worst
environmental disaster in U.S. history, but also the worst accidental oil
spill ever in the history of the world. 80 Shutting down the well did not
magically make the oil go away, despite early government claims to the
contrary. 81
As a result of the blowout, large quantities of oil are on the bottom
of the ocean and suspended in the water column in hundred-mile-long
plumes 82 —a deadly threat to fish populations, coral reefs, and other
Thad Allen, USCG, announced the well was effectively dead after a relief well was completed and
cement was pumped into the Macondo well to seal it. Associated Press, Blown-out BP Oil Well
Finally Sealed, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2010), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
blownout-bp-oil-well-finally-sealed-2083767.html.
76
The official estimate is that at the beginning of the disaster, the oil was flowing at 63,000
barrels per day, and just before the well was capped, the flow was 53,000 barrels per day. Since there
are forty-two gallons in a barrel, that means that the flow rate in gallons was between 2.2 and 2.6
million gallons per day. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Scientific Teams Refine
Estimates of Oil Flow from BP’s Well Prior to Capping (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Scientific-Teams-Refine-Estimates-of-Oil-Flow-from-BPWell-Prior-to-Capping.cfm [hereinafter Scientific Teams Refine Estimates].
77
The most common figure quoted for the size of the Exxon Valdez spill is eleven million
gallons. That figure apparently comes from Exxon’s own calculations and many suggest it is an
underestimate. See How Much Oil Really Spilled from the Exxon Valdez, ON THE MEDIA (June 18,
2010), www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/06/18/01.
78
Scientific Teams Refine Estimates, supra note 76.
79
All of the key statistics related to fisheries closures can be found in Deepwater Horizon/BP
Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Area Closures Due to BP Oil Spill, NOAA
FISHERIES SERV., sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm (last updated Apr. 29,
2011). As of this writing, almost the entire Gulf has been reopened to fishing.
80
The only worse spill was the intentional release from the Kuwaiti oil fields during the First
Gulf War.
81
See Federal Science Report Details Fate of Oil from BP Spill, NOAA (Aug. 4, 2010),
www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100804_oil.html; JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET: WHAT HAPPENED TO
THE OIL?, available at www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/PDFs/
OilBudget_description_%2083final.pdf (claiming that the vast majority of the oil had been
recovered, burned, skimmed or dispersed and degraded, thus posing no continuing threat to the
environment). For refutation of this claim, see, e.g., Matt Gutman & Kevin Dolak, Oil from the BP
Spill Found at Bottom of Gulf, ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2010), abcnews.go.com/WN/oil-bp-spillfound-bottom-gulf/story?id=11618039; John D. Sutter, Defender of the Deep: The Oil’s Not Gone,
CNN U.S. (Aug. 24, 2010), articles.cnn.com/2010-08-24/us/samantha.joye.gulf.oil_1_oil-spillsamantha-joye-ecological-disaster?_s=PM:US.
82
David Biello, Massive Oil Plume Confirmed in Gulf of Mexico, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
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marine life, such as whales and turtles.
Then there is the dispersant. Over the course of the eighty-seven
days, BP sprayed 1.84 million gallons of Corexit into the Gulf of
Mexico. 83 Of that, 1.07 million gallons were on the surface waters of the
Gulf of Mexico and the remaining 771,000 gallons were applied near the
head of the well (at a depth of 5000 feet). 84 Not only was this quantity of
dispersant unprecedented, but dispersants had never before been sprayed
in a water column. 85 The dispersant itself is toxic with very little known
about its long-term effects on humans or the environment. 86 What is
known is troubling. For example, Corexit was used heavily after the
Exxon Valdez oil spill. 87 Many clean-up workers later suffered kidney,
liver, and other health problems thought to be related to the dispersant. 88
Moreover, because of harmful effects on sea life, Corexit has been
banned for a decade in the United Kingdom. 89 Nonetheless, BP elected
to use Corexit even though less toxic and more effective alternative
dispersants were available. 90
Dispersants do not change the chemical composition of the oil, nor
do they make oil any less toxic. Instead, dispersants break an oil slick up
into tiny oil droplets—thereby dispersing the spill. 91 This is thought to

(Aug. 19, 2010), www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=masive-oil-plume-confirmed-in-gulfof-mexico.
83
See Joint Info. Ctr., The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil
Spill, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Sept. 17, 2010), www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/09/17/
ongoing-administration-wide-response-deepwater-bp-oil-spill.
84
Id.
85
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
Dispersants, www.oilspillcommission.gov/media/response/response-actions-dispersants.html (last
visited June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Dispersants].
86
Indeed, the manufacturer’s material safety data sheet states that no toxicity studies have
been performed on Corexit. See NALCO, MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET: COREXIT 9500 (2005),
available at www.lmrk.org/corexit_9500_uscueg.539287.pdf.
87
For analysis of the parallels between the Exxon Valdez spill and the BP spill, focusing on
systemic failure to adequately regulate offshore, see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters:
Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. News & Analysis
11,041 (2010), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1726053.
88
Paul Quinlan, Less Toxic Dispersants Lose Out in BP Oil Spill Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/energy-environment/13greenwireless-toxic-dispersants-lose-out-in-bp-oil-spil-81183.html.
89
Letter from Rep. Edward J. Markey to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator (May 17, 2010),
available at www.propublica.org/documents/item/letter-about-disperants-from-rep.-markey-to-epa1.
90
Quinlan, supra note 88; Jeffrey Ball, Spill’s Ills Could Be Felt Under the Water, WALL ST.
J. (May 17, 2010), available at online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870437900457524884
1234368332.html.
91
For an explanation of dispersants aimed at the lay reader, see Katie Peek, How Do Oil
Dispersants Work? POPSCI (May 28, 2010), www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-05/how-do-oil-
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reduce the amount of oil that comes onshore. 92 However, it does so by
increasing the amount of oil that remains suspended in the water column.
Dispersants have never been applied on the scale they were used by BP,
and as Senator Sheldon Whitehouse pointed out, there are real questions
whether their use will make things better or worse. 93 In essence, the spill
response in the Gulf of Mexico was a giant chemistry experiment.
D.

THE SIMPLE EXPLANATION

One obvious explanation for this disaster is that BP is a bad actor.
There is certainly ample evidence both from the Deepwater Horizon
disaster and from BP’s general modus operandi to support such a
conclusion.
BP’s conduct in the days leading up to the explosion certainly gives
support to the inference of culpability. BP knew, long before the
Macondo well blew out on April 20, that it had no way to stop the leak.
The company knew this when it elected not to conduct a cement bond
log test on the well 94 and when it chose the “cheap but risky” method to
case the well. 95 BP knew this on April 9, 2010, when the company
claimed in written comments that its deep water drilling activities “would
not have an effect, cumulatively or individually, on the environment.” 96
Worst of all, BP knew this when it assured MMS:
In the event of an unanticipated blowout resulting in an oil spill, it is
unlikely to have an impact based on the industry-wide standards for
using proven equipment and technology for such responses,
implementation of BP’s Regional Oil Spill Response Plan which
address [sic] available equipment and personnel, techniques for

dispersants-work.
92
Dispersants, supra note 85.
93
“It is unclear if it [Corexit] will limit the damage from the spill, or cause even greater
harm.” Sen. Whitehouse, Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on the Use of
Dispersants in the Gulf Oil Spill (C-Span television broadcast, Aug. 4, 2010), available at www.cspanvideo.org/program/294897-2; Matthew L. Wald, The Politics of Dispersants, N.Y. TIMES
GREEN, (Aug. 4, 2010, 2:58 PM), green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/the-politics-of-dispersants/.
94
Testimony of John Guide, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation
Team (C-Span television broadcast July 22, 2010), available at www.c-spanvideo.org/
program/294696-2.
95
Ian Urbina, BP Used Riskier Method to Seal Well Before Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html?_r=2&hp.
96
Letter from Margaret D. Laney, Senior Federal Affairs Director, BP Am., Inc., to Nancy
Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, on Steps to Modernize and Reinvigorate NEPA (Apr. 9,
2010), available at media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/
BP_letter_050410.pdf (commenting on behalf of BP in favor of categorical exclusions).
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containment, and recovery and removal of the oil spill. 97

Unfortunately, there were no such proven and available equipment or
techniques. 98 Indeed, it is an open secret in the industry that nobody has
any idea of how to stop a deep sea leak. 99
Even before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP’s safety record was
abysmal. In a series of high-profile incidents, BP’s failures to invest in
safety left a trail of death and destruction around the world, resulting in
multiple criminal and civil sanctions. In the United States, the two
highest profile incidents occurred in 2005 and 2006. In 2005, BP’s
largest refinery, a 19.3-million-gallon-a-day facility in Texas City,
Texas, exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring more than 180.100
Federal investigators discovered more than 300 safety violations at the
facility and fined the company $21.3 million. 101 The Chemical Safety
Board attributed the disaster to ill-advised cost-cutting that skimped on
maintenance. 102 BP ultimately pled guilty to criminal violations of the
Clean Air Act and paid $50 million in criminal fines. 103 In October 2009,
OSHA again fined BP for 709 violations at the same Texas plant,
including many of the same violations that caused the fatal 2005
explosion. This time the fine was an OSHA record—$87.7 million. 104
97

BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (2009), available at
www.boemre.gov/DeepwaterHorizon/BP_Regional_OSRP_Redactedv2.pdf.
98
In announcing the failure of the “top kill” and announcing the company’s next plan to stop
the leak, BP’s Chief Operating Officer cautioned that as with earlier efforts, it had never been tried
at 5000 feet below sea level using robotic submarines. Margot Roosevelt & Louis Sahagun, Gloom
Grows as BP’s “Top Kill” Effort Fails, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2010), available at
articles.latimes.com/2010/may/30/nation/la-na-oil-spill-20100530 (quoting Doug Suttles, BP Chief
Operating Officer).
99
In a moment of candor unusual in the offshore drilling context, Shell admitted as much in
an Environmental Assessment it filed with MMS for a drilling project. See SHELL DEEPWATER DEV.
INC., INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENT, GREEN CANYON AREA,
BLOCKS 158 & 202 (May 9, 2000), available at www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/
PLANS/1/1263.pdf [hereinafter BLOCKS 158 & 202] (MMS nonetheless issued a Finding of No
Significant Impact, and approved Shell’s proposal).
100
U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT: REFINERY
EXPLOSION AND FIRE (Mar. 2007), available at www.csb.gov/assets/document/
CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.
101
Id. For perspective, that amounted to roughly the equivalent of two-and-a-half hours’
worth of production from Thunder Horse.
102
Steven Mufson, Cost-Cutting Led to Blast at BP Plant, Probe Finds, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 2006, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/
AR2006103001154.html.
103
Katherine Fraser, BP Texas City Disaster Case: Judge Found Punishment Fit the Crime,
THE BARREL (Mar. 18, 2009), available at www.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2009/03/18/
bp_texas_city_disaster_case_judge_found_punishment_fit_the_crime.html.
104
News Release, U. S. Dep’t of Labor, US Department of Labor[’]s OSHA Issues Record-
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The very next year, 2006, poor maintenance on a BP pipeline in
Alaska led to the largest oil spill ever in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay, spewing
nearly 300,000 gallons of crude oil. 105 Once again, BP’s cost-cutting led
to disaster. BP pled guilty to criminal negligence, paid a $20 million
criminal fine, 106 and received three years of probation. 107 Testifying
about the disaster before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, Admiral Thomas Barrett, administrator of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration for the Department of
Transportation, repeatedly testified about BP’s operations that “most
operators demonstrate a higher standard of care in their operations” and
said it was “a mystery” why BP did not perform routine maintenance. 108
Things did not improve much after BP’s twin criminal convictions.
Between 2007 and 2010, just two BP facilities, the Texas facility that had
been the site of the 2005 disaster and a Toledo, Ohio, facility received
citations for 862 OSHA violations. 109 These violations constituted 97%
of the industry total, and were two orders of magnitude greater than those
of any other oil company. 110 What is worse, the overwhelming majority
(760) were for “willful and egregious” safety violations. 111 During the
same time period, BP’s competitors had much stronger safety track
records. ConocoPhillips and Sunoco each received eight such citations,
CITGO had two, and Exxon had one. 112
breaking Fines to BP (Oct. 30, 2009), available at www.osha.gov/dep/bp/bp.html.
105
Joe Nocera, Green Logo, But BP Is Old Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, available at
select.nytimes.com/2006/08/12/business/worldbusiness/12nocera.html?_r=1.
106
Gary White, US Sues BP over Prudhoe Bay Spill, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 1, 2009),
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/5091013/US-sues-BP-over-PrudhoeBay-oil-spill.html.
107
Jill Burke, BP Still Fighting Fines Stemming from ’06 Oil Spills at Prudhoe Bay, ALASKA
DISPATCH, May 17, 2010, available at alaskadispatch.com/dispatches/energy/5369-bp-still-fightingfines-stemming-from-06-oil-spills-at-prudhoe-bay.
108
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., S. Hrg. 109-766, at 6 (Sept. 12,
2006), available at ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109s/32146.txt (statement of Vice Admiral
Thomas Barrett, U.S. Coast Guard (retired), Administrator, Pipeline & Hazardous Safety Materials
Safety Admin., Dep’t of Transp.); see also Nelson Schwartz, Can BP Bounce Back? FORTUNE (Oct.
31, 2006), available at money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/10/
16/8388595/index.htm.
109
Jim Morris & M.B. Pell, Renegade Refiner: OSHA Says BP Has “Systemic Safety
Problem,”
CENTER
FOR
PUBLIC
INTEGRITY
(May
17,
2010),
www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/2085/.
110
Id.; see also Pierre Thomas, BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2010),
abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042.
111
Jim Morris & M.B. Pell, supra note 109.
112
The Role of the Interior Department in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (July 20, 2010),
available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bLA8tK3TjA&feature=relmfu (Rep. John Sullivan
questioning BP CEO Tony Hayward.)
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BP’s safety track record outside the United States is similarly
checkered. In 2000, BP’s Grangemouth, Scotland, facility suffered three
major and potentially life-threatening incidents. 113 Over a two-week
period, BP’s Grangemouth facility experienced a power distribution
failure, leading to the emergency shutdown of the oil refinery, the
rupture of a main steam pipe, and a fire in the refinery’s fluidized
catalytic cracker unit. 114 BP was convicted of criminal violations of the
U.K. Health and Safety at Work Act for these events, 115 and it paid £1
million in fines. 116 The U.K. Health and Safety Executive, which
investigated the incidents, attributed them to weaknesses in BP’s safety
management system, concluding that BP lacked a “strong, consistent
overall strategy for major accident prevention.” 117 The accidents were
attributed to a tendency “to place relatively high emphasis on short-term
benefits of cost and speed and to be readier to make compromises over
longer-term issues like plant reliability.” 118
In 2003, BP’s Forties Alpha platform in the North Sea suffered a
gas line rupture. The Platform flooded with methane, and only fortunate
weather conditions prevented an explosion. 119 BP admitted breaking the
law by allowing pipes to corrode and paid a £200,000 fine. 120 Sounding
themes from the 2000 U.K. incident, Deputy Offshore Installation
Manager, Oberon Houston, testified during the investigation that “[t]he
focus on controlling costs was acute at BP, to the point that it became a
distraction. They just go after it with a ferocity that is mind-numbing and
terrifying.” 121 This 2003 near miss came on the heels not only of the
Grangemouth incident described above, but also of a 1999 explosion and
fire on another North Sea gas platform, the Exploration Bruce. In that
earlier incident, BP confessed to violating health and safety regulations
and received the maximum possible fine of £20,000. 122

113

U.K. HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., MAJOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: BP
GRANGEMOUTH SCOTLAND (Aug. 18, 2003), available at www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/
images/bprgrangemouth.pdf.
114
Id. at 4-6.
115
Id. at 49-51.
116
Id. at 1.
117
Id. at 59.
118
Id. at 63.
119
Loren Steffy, Quick Payouts BP’s Goal, HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 8, 2010), available at
www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy/7330797.html.
120
BP Fined over Offshore Gas Leak, BBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2004), available at
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/4016921.stm.
121
For a full description of this and BP’s other serious safety breaches, see LOREN C. STEFFY,
DROWNING IN OIL: BP AND THE RECKLESS PURSUIT OF PROFIT (2010).
122
Maximum Fine for Oil Firm over Gas Explosion, THE HERALD (Glasgow) (May 11, 1999).
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Over the decade leading up to the Gulf disaster BP suffered one
industrial safety failure after another. Despite repeated proclamations
about “renewing a commitment to safety” and “focusing like a laser on
safety,” BP’s track record remained poor. All of the government
investigations into these varied disasters sounded the same theme: BP
had an inadequate safety culture. The company was unduly focused on
cost-cutting, even at the expense of safety. The President’s Commission
Report also struck this chord, concluding, “BP does not have consistent
and reliable risk-management processes—and thus has been unable to
meet its professed commitment to safety. BP’s safety lapses have been
chronic.” BP has the dubious distinction of having caused the worst
accidental marine oil spill ever, the worst oil spill in the history of the
North Slope, and the worst U.S. refinery disaster in decades.
Overall, the straightforward answer to the question of how this
disaster happened is that BP put profit before safety. In a June 14, 2010,
letter to Tony Hayward, then-Chair of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Henry Waxman, along with Michigan Representative
Bart Stupak, detailed five key choices 123 BP made in the days leading up
to the disaster that involved cutting corners, choosing cheaper but more
risky drilling methods, or otherwise “increas[ing] the dangers of a
catastrophic well failure.” 124 These individual cost-cutting choices were
part of a larger pattern. As Representative Edward Markey pointed out,
over the three years prior to the spill, BP invested $39 billion to explore
for new oil and gas, while investing only a “paltry” $20 million per year
in safety, accident prevention, and spill response research. 125 BP did,
however, invest heavily in a public relations campaign intended to cloak
the company in an aura of environmental responsibility.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) continues to insist that the
BP disaster was an “isolated incident.” 126 The “fact” that there has not
123

These choices were “(1) the decision to use a well design with few barriers to gas flow; (2)
the failure to use a sufficient number of ‘centralizers’ to prevent channeling during the cement
process; (3) the failure to run a cement bond log to evaluate the effectiveness of the cement job; (4)
the failure to circulate potentially gas-bearing drilling muds out of the well; and (5) the failure to
secure the wellhead with a lockdown sleeve before allowing pressure on the seal from below. The
common feature of these five decisions is that they posed a trade-off between cost and well safety.”
Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and Bart Stupak to Tony Hayward, Chief Executive Officer of
BP (June 14, 2010), available at online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20100614LetterToHayward.pdf.
124
Id.
125
Drilling Down on America’s Energy Future, Safety Security and Clean Energy: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (June 15, 2010) (statement
of
Rep.
Edward
J.
Markey,
Chairman),
available
at
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100615/Markey.Statement.ee.06.15.2010.pdf.
126
Jonathan Tilove, Oil Spokesman Calls for More Drilling, NOLA.COM (Jan. 5, 2011),
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been a single major blowout from American operations in the Gulf of
Mexico in decades is frequently offered to buttress BP’s repeated claims
that the oil spill was somehow unforeseeable 127 and thus outside the
realm of reasonable predictions. 128 Yet, blowouts are not actually that
rare, 129 and near misses are even more common. 130 Between 2006 and
2010, regulators tabulated twenty-five blowouts in the Gulf of
Mexico. 131 During that same time period, there were also sixty-eight
spills of greater than fifty barrels (2100 gallons). 132
The oil industry has made a concerted effort to keep the focus away
from a broader analysis of offshore drilling, one that goes beyond BP or
the specifics of the Macondo disaster. Given the tremendous sway that
the API wields over the regulatory decisionmaking regarding offshore
drilling, the industry lobbying group has a vested interest in diverting
attention from statutory flaws, lack of agency resources, and the intimate
relationship that regulators developed with the oil industry. These factors
all combined to lull regulators into a state of quiescence, if not
complacency. Lack of funding, combined with a revolving door between
industry and the regulated community, meant that regulators too often
viewed their task through the lens of industry 133 rather than from the
perspective of the public whose interests the agency was sworn to
protect. The statutory regime, which gave MMS the dual (and
conflicting) tasks of promoting and regulating offshore drilling, furthered

www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2011/01/oil_spokesman_calls_for_more_d.html.
127
See, e.g., Ben Geman, BP Chief Calls Failure of Blowout Preventer “Unprecedented,”
THE HILL (May 3, 2010, 9:28 AM ET), thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/95577-bp-ceo-callsfailure-of-blowout-preventer-unprecedented (quoting BP CEO Tony Hayward as claiming, “This is
an unprecedented accident in terms of the failure of the blowout preventer. . . . It is the ultimate
safety system on any rig and there is no precedent for them failing.”).
128
See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the
House Committee on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Erik Milito, Upstream
Director, American Petroleum Institute).
129
See, e.g., Les Blumenthal, Decade-Old Report Cited Failure of Oil Rig Safety System,
MCCLATCHY, (Apr. 30, 2010), www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/30/93250/us-report-found-failureof-offshore.html.
130
The International Association of Drillers has compiled a litany of “near miss” incidents.
See, e.g., Alerts, INT’L ASS’N OF DRILLING CONTRACTORS, www.iadc.org/alerts.htm (last visited
June 28, 2011).
131
BOEMRE, Loss of Well Control: Statistics and Summaries 2006-2010,
www.boemre.gov/incidents/blowouts.htm (last visited June 28, 2011).
132
BOEMRE, Spills, Statistics and Summaries 1996-2011, www.boemre.gov/incidents/
spills1996-2011.htm (last visited June 28, 2011). In 2005 alone, there were forty-nine such spills. Id.
133
Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2010, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mms.html (quoting Hammond Eve,
former director of MMS’s environmental division, characterizing the agency as “pro-industry to the
point of being blind”).
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this tendency toward role confusion and outright regulatory capture. The
President’s Commission Report highlighted this aspect of the disaster:
“On many . . . critical matters, the federal regulations either failed to
account for the particular challenges of deepwater drilling or were silent
altogether.” 134
It would be a mistake to embrace the “BP is a bad actor” theory as
the sole cause of the Gulf Oil Spill. Without diminishing BP’s
culpability, it is clear that there are major structural problems associated
with the way the government approaches the task of regulating offshore
drilling. These structural problems, in turn, created a context in which it
was possible for BP to make those poor choices. That a private company
might be willing to trade off safety in favor of cost-savings ought not be
surprising—after all, it is precisely this tendency of private actors to
overvalue costs to themselves and undervalue public safety and goods
that is one of the primary justifications of regulation in the first place.
The dysfunction runs much deeper than a single risk-taking company.
One must also ask, Where were the regulators?
III. THE COMPLEX EXPLANATION: A REGULATORY BACKDROP
CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR DISASTER TO OCCUR
The risks linked to the ever-more-challenging environments
associated with a trend toward deeper and deeper drilling are immense.
Machinery must withstand up to 15,000 psi of pressure, 135 the frigid cold
of the water, and the intense heat of the oil roiling up out of the earth at
300-plus degrees Fahrenheit. 136 The temperature gradient across the
equipment can be significant. Indeed, as one Shell executive said, “The
deepwater environment is unforgiving, the challenges are immense and
the deeper you go, the more difficult it gets.” 137 The inhospitable nature
of the deep-sea environment necessitates that all the work be done by
remotely controlled robotic subs. Complexity piles on top of complexity.

134

NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 225.
A 2006 WEST Engineering Services report noted that MMS is aware of some exploration
drilling prospects where reservoir conditions are as high as 28,000 psi. However, there are currently
no blowout preventers capable of withstanding more than 15,000 psi. WEST ENG’G SERVS., ASSESS
THE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY OF USING EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY BOP AND WELLHEAD
COMPONENTS, AT PRESSURES IN EXCESS OF RATED WORKING PRESSURE 5 (2006), available at
www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/566/566AA.pdf [hereinafter ASSESS THE ACCEPTABILITY AND
SAFETY].
136
WEST ENG’G SERVS., HIGH TEMPERATURE ELASTOMER STUDY FOR MMS 6 (June 2,
2009), available at www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/621/AA.pdf.
137
LEHNER & DEANS, supra note 40, at 88 (quoting a 2009 speech by Matthias Bichsel,
director for projects and technology at Shell).
135

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

21

02_BRATSPIES PRINTER VERSION

9/26/2011 1:54:30 PM

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

28

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

These technical challenges make deepwater operations very expensive to
develop, but the high flow rates of the wells and the size of the fields
mean that successful wells can be immensely profitable. As the riskreward profile increased, regulation and oversight did not keep up with
drilling advances. Instead, MMS came to rely more and more on API as
the de facto regulator for offshore drilling.
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY REGIMES (OCSLA AND NEPA)

The key statutes governing offshore oil production are the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 138 and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 139 As the agency charged with
overseeing offshore development, MMS’s programmatic and regulatory
decisions had to comply with both acts.
Under OCSLA, 140 Congress has charged the Department of Interior
with overseeing the “expeditious and orderly development [of offshore
oil resources], subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is
consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national
needs.” 141 Oil and gas development activities managed under the
OCSLA occur in four distinct stages: (1) development of a five-year
leasing plan, 142 (2) issuance of oil and gas leases (often called the leasesale), 143 (3) approval of a lessee’s exploration plans, 144 and (4) approval
of a lessee’s development and production plans. 145 This tiered structure
is intended to allow the agency to start with broad-based planning and
then move “to an increasingly narrower focus as actual development
grows more imminent.” 146
At each stage of the process, the agency is expected to conduct a
careful examination of the environmental impact of the proposed
activities, 147 satisfying duties under both the OCSLA and NEPA. At
every stage of federal agency decision-making related to offshore oil
138

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
140
The OCSLA defines the “outer Continental Shelf,” as “all submerged lands lying seaward
and outside of the area of land [under state control] and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a)
(Westlaw 2011).
141
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A.§ 1332(3) (Westlaw 2011).
142
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Westlaw 2011).
143
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1337, 1345 (Westlaw 2011).
144
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1340 (Westlaw 2011).
145
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351 (Westlaw 2011).
146
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1295-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
147
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A § 1344 (Westlaw).
139
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exploration and development, the agency must determine if the action
has the potential to affect the quality of the human environment. To do
so, it must engage in one of three levels of NEPA analysis: 148 1) prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) when the agency determines
that the proposed action has the potential for significant environmental
impacts; 2) prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine
whether the agency should make a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) or should prepare an EIS; or 3) apply a Categorical Exclusion
(CE) when the agency determines that the activity does not, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, result in individually or
cumulatively significant environmental effects. 149 While NEPA requires
that the agency engage in environmental analysis, it provides no
substantive standards on its own; instead, those come from the OCSLA.
The OCSLA directs the Department of Interior to consider “the
potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values of
the Outer Continental Shelf and the marine, coastal, and human
environments,” 150 and to balance “between the potential for
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and
the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.” 151 However, the
statute is silent as to how this balance should be struck. Unlike some
environmental statutes, OCSLA does not specify the levels of protection
the agency must deliver, either with regard to human health or
environmental protection. 152 Nor does the OCSLA set a baseline about
the kinds of safety technology the agency must require of lessees.
The agency was left to exercise a very broad delegation of
regulatory authority as it saw fit. However, MMS consistently allowed
lessees to replace OCSLA’s site-specific environmental evaluations with
references to more general, regional evaluations, 153 and it categorically
148

DOI’s Departmental Manual documents policies and procedures applicable to the
Department, available at www.doi.gov/app%5FDM/. The Manual sets forth requirements specific to
MMS NEPA implementation. Departmental Manual, Part 516, Chapter 15, Managing the NEPA
Process-MMS, available at www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/planning/nepa/webguide/
departmental_manual/516_dm_chapter_15.html.
149
40 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (Westlaw 2011).
150
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
151
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1344 (a)(1)-(3) (Westlaw 2011).
152
Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(1) (Westlaw 2011) (Clean Air Act provision requiring national
primary ambient air quality standards to allow “an adequate margin of safety . . . requisite to protect
the public health”). For a lengthy discussion of this point, see ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY BLOWOUT: HOW REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP
DISASTER POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED TO AVOID A RECURRENCE (2010),
available at www.progressivereform.org/articles/BP_Reg_Blowout_1007.pdf.
153
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS AND
DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS 17-19, NTL NO. 2008-G04 (Apr. 1,
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exempted large swaths of the Gulf of Mexico from NEPA analysis. 154
Further, because MMS willingly accepted industry representations that a
spill was “unlikely” 155 and the resulting consequences “minimal,” 156
MMS accepted a role as cheerleader and booster for the drilling industry,
consistently choosing oil production over environmental protection.
MMS made these choices even though the Coast Guard warned that oil
producers were not developing safety technologies to match their rapidly
expanding extraction abilities. 157 Nevertheless, the agency routinely
accepted industry recommendations about the level and kinds of safety
technologies and techniques that would be sufficient to protect the
environment.
Two problems arose because of MMS’s laissez faire approach to
regulating, both of which directly contributed to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. The first problem surrounds the agency’s failure to adequately
specify the minimum standards for blowout preventers to ensure that
these devices serve as a critical last defense against disaster. The second
problem involves the agency’s failure to require adequate spill response
planning. After demonstrating how both problems are rooted in a flawed
statutory mandate, this Part will conclude by describing the role that nonstatutory agency dynamics played in creating the conditions for disaster,
namely the agency’s overly cozy relationship with industry and the
agency’s lack of adequate funding.
i.

Blowout Preventers as an Example of Regulatory Failure

One of the major risks posed by oil exploration is the risk of a
blowout—the uncontrolled flow of oil stemming from a loss of control of
a well. Blowouts can occur during any phase of developing a well site,
from exploratory drilling to find a well site, to the last act of sealing a
well at exhaustion. They typically occur when improperly balanced well
pressures result in sudden, uncontrolled releases of fluids from a
wellhead or wellbore. 158

2008), www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2008NTLs/08-g04.pdf.
154
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., STRATEGY FOR POSTLEASE NEPA COMPLIANCE IN DEEPWATER
AREAS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 1-2, available at www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/
ea_grid/NEPADWSTRATEGY.PDF (last visited June 28, 2011). For an analysis of how MMS’s
lack of NEPA rigor contributed to the disaster, see Houck, supra note 4.
155
See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
156
Id.
157
U.S. COAST GUARD, 2002 SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AFTER ACTION REPORT 22
(Dec. 13, 2002), available at www.uscg.mil/history/docs/2002SONSAARfinalReport.pdf.
158
See BLOCKS 158 & 202, supra note 99.
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The Deepwater Horizon was considered among the most
technologically advanced drilling platforms in the world. 159 Yet this
advanced technology—including its blowout protector—failed to prevent
a torrent of oil from being unleashed into the Gulf. As detailed above, a
series of poor choices on the Deepwater Horizon was the proximate
cause of the blowout preventer’s failure. However, a full understanding
of what went wrong must also examine the agency’s regulation, or lack
thereof, of this critical safety device that is supposed to perform
flawlessly regardless of drilling conditions.
A blowout preventer is a device that is supposed to activate
automatically to seal a well in response to a pressure surge, thereby
preventing a blowout. 160 It is composed of a series of rams that are
intended to cut the drilling pipe and seal the well in case of loss of
control. 161 As such, these devices are critical safety equipment for any
drilling operation. The basic technology was developed about a century
ago. 162 Since then, the materials used to construct blowout preventers
have become more sophisticated, but the basic idea has not changed
substantially. 163
The greater pressures and temperatures encountered during drilling
in ultra-deep waters challenge the integrity of blowout preventers. 164
Moreover, the temperature and pressure that a blowout preventer will be

159

See, e.g., Letter from Senator Benjamin Cardin to President Barak Obama (Apr. 20, 2010).
Senator Robert Menendez characterized it as “a rig so technologically advanced it could not spill.”
See also Hearing to Review Current Issues Related to Offshore Oil and Gas Development Before S.
Comm.
on
Energy
&
Natural
Res.
(May
16,
2010),
available
at
energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.LiveStream&Hearing_id=3f911465-0f1b5a31-7d0d-138b354e1a60. Just a year earlier, Transocean, the rig’s owner, had announced that the
Deepwater Horizon had drilled the deepest well ever. Deepwater Horizon Drills World’s Deepest
Oil & Gas Well, TRANSOCEAN (2011), www.deepwater.com/fw/main/IDeepwater-Horizon-i-DrillsWorlds-Deepest-Oil-and-Gas-Well-419C151.html.
160
Melvyn (Mel) F. Whitby, Evolution of a Subsea BOP, DRILLING CONTRACTOR (May
2007), at 36, available at www.drillingcontractor.org/dcpi/dc-mayjune07/DC_May07_BOP.pdf
(describing blowout preventers as “the main barrier protecting human life, capital equipment and the
environment” in cases of emergency).
161
The Blowout Preventer attaches to the subsea wellhead. The key components for purposes
of this analysis are the Blind Shear Rams, which are designed to sever drill pipe that might be in the
wellbore and seal the wellbore in the event of the loss of well control. Although the blowout
preventer also has variable bore pipe rams to close and seal around drill pipe, and casing shear rams
to sever large diameter casings, the blind shear rams are the only set of rams designed to cut drill
pipe and seal the well in the event of a blowout. See DET NORSKE VERITAS, supra note 72, at 38
(providing detailed description of the blowout preventer that failed in the Deepwater Horizon
disaster).
162
Whitby, supra note 160.
163
Id.
164
WEST ENG’G SERVS., supra note 136, at 6.
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exposed to varies based on the specifics of the well conditions and the
flow rate. 165 Despite tests showing that blowout protection devices fail
frequently, 166 MMS has not established minimum capabilities for
blowout preventers or testing protocols, nor has it required additional
safety devices like acoustic triggers that allow remote-control activation
of a blowout preventer. These last-ditch safety devices are required in
Norway and Brazil. 167 As a result, there is no regulatory standard for
assessing the heat tolerance limits of a blowout preventer. 168 There are
suggested industry testing protocols created by API, but they do not
reflect real-world conditions, 169 and these kinds of assessments are not
done routinely. 170
1.

Lack of Standards for Blowout Preventers

After the blowout, BP CEO Tony Hayward said of blowout
preventers in general: “It’s unprecedented for it to fail.” 171 Yet, the
problem with blowout preventers is not something that the industry knew
only in retrospect after the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer failed.
In 1999, a MMS sponsored study identified 117 blowout preventer
failures in a two-year period. 172 More than half of the blowout
preventers were designated “safety critical failures,” meaning each
occurred when a blowout preventer was installed on the rig and might
have been needed in an emergency. 173 A few years later, an industry-led
study documented that during safety testing in the Gulf of Mexico,
blowout preventers failed sixty-two times between 2004 and 2006.174
Moreover, a 2009 reliability study of blowout preventers deployed in the
165

ASSESS THE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 135.
See, e.g., Mark Clayton, Studies Suggest MMS Knew Blowout Preventers Had “Critical”
Flaws,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(June
17,
2010),
available
at
www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0617/Studies-suggest-MMS-knew-blowout-preventers-had-criticalflaws.
167
Russell Gold, Ben Casselman & Guy Chazan, Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2010, available at online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704423504575212031417936798.html.
168
WEST ENG’G SERVS., supra note 136.
169
Id. at 23.
170
Id. at 16-17.
171
See Oil Blowout Preventers Known to Fail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 8, 2010), available
at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/08/national/main6469368.shtml.
172
SINTEF INDUS. MGMT., RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP SYSTEMS FOR DEEPWATER
APPLICATION, PHASE II DW 33-36 (Nov. 7, 1999), available at www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/
319/319aa.pdf [hereinafter RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP].
173
Id. at 85.
174
ASSESS THE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 135.
166
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Gulf of Mexico concluded that during that time period, there were four
“safety critical failures” of blowout preventers, meaning equipment
malfunctions serious enough to have allowed “an uncontrolled release”
of crude oil from the well bore. 175 Analyzing this data, the Christian
Science Monitor concluded that there was one “safety critical failure” for
every 59.5 wells drilled in the test period, and one per 9.5 rigs. 176
Additionally, MMS issued a safety alert in 2005 warning that deepwater
operations had experienced a significant number of incidents in which
the components of the blowout preventer stack disconnected, a situation
that has the potential to cause serious well-control issues. 177 This risk
was particularly acute if the disconnect occurred during drilling of a
high-pressure well, 178 as had happened with BP’s Thunder Horse well in
2003. 179
This series of near misses in the Gulf of Mexico ought to have
raised both public and private alarm bells. 180 If nothing else, the 2003
Thunder Horse blowout ought to have put these issues squarely on BP’s
and the agency’s horizon. Indeed, in response to the 2003 Thunder Horse
incident, an NOAA modeler wrote that the “potential for a deep well
blowout was on everyone’s mind” 181 because it was clear that a “[l]oss of
well containment would result in more oil spilled in a week than
occurred during the whole of the T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill.” 182 The
NOAA modeling done after the Thunder Horse incident assumed a flow
rate of 100,000 barrels a day from a possible spill. 183 BP’s own internal
175

Mark Clayton, Before BP Oil Spill, Big Oil-led Study Urged Feds to Cut Safety Testing,
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(June
2,
2010),
available
at
CHRISTIAN
www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0602/Before-BP-oil-spill-Big-Oil-led-study-urged-feds-to-cutsafety-testing.
176
Id.
177
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SAFETY ALERT 231, HUMAN ENGINEERING FACTORS RESULT IN
INCREASING NUMBERS OF RISER DISCONNECTS (May 31, 2005), available at
www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/safealt/SA_231.pdf; see also DAVID DYKES, DAVID
TROCQUET & RANDALL JOSEY, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., INVESTIGATION OF RISER DISCONNECT
AND BLOWOUT MISSISSIPPI BLOCK CANYON 538, OCS-G 16614 WELL #2 (Feb. 28, 2000), available
at www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2001/2001-005.pdf
178
ASSESS THE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 135, at 5.
179
BEEGLE-KRAUSE & LYNCH, supra note 41. Fortunately, the Thunder Horse blowout
preventer did its job, and the release from the well was limited to the release of 2450 barrels
(110,250 gallons) of synthetic drilling mud. Id. at 2.
180
Ben Casselman & Guy Chazan, Disaster Plans Lacking at Deep Rigs, WALL ST. J., May
18, 2010, at A1, available at online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033154045752
50591376735052.html (documenting how safety technology was overwhelmed by the new
challenges of operating at ever-greater depths).
181
BEEGLE-KRAUSE & LYNCH, supra note 41.
182
Id.
183
Id. at app. B.
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investigation identified “what should be done if well control were lost”
as a key question in its incident response. 184 Even though the scale of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster was unprecedented, the possibility of a large
spill stemming from a blowout of a deepwater well was plainly in view.
The failure to learn from the Thunder Horse near-catastrophe
supports both the straightforward and the complex explanations for the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. Of all entities, BP should have internalized
lessons from this incident. It should have developed a plan for how to
respond to loss of control of a deepwater well. Instead, BP published a
series of articles focused on leadership and communications lessons
(none of which it apparently followed in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon blowout). 185
Over the years that ultra-deep drilling occurred, two key problems
with blowout preventers were identified over and over: the inability of a
blowout preventer to withstand the intense pressure gradients at greater
depths, and the inability of the sheer rams to cut the thicker pipes being
used in ultra-deepwater drilling. Both kinds of problems were implicated
in the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
A 2004 joint industry-MMS study suggested that the use of thicker
drilling pipes in ultra-deep water made the shear ram component of
blowout preventers increasingly prone to failure in deep water. 186 Along
the same lines, a 2006 study noted that there were neither MMS
regulations nor API standards specifying the external pressure that
blowout preventers must be able to withstand. 187 The study reported that
“the maximum allowable external pressure is never published and indeed
may not even be known by the manufacturer. 188 If differential pressure is
applied to a component not designed to withstand it, there could be
serious consequences for well control.” 189 The report cautioned: “the
deeper the water the greater the risk,” 190 and observed that the fact that

184

Karen Bybee, Thunder Horse Drilling-Riser Break—The Road to Recovery 48, 49-59, J.
SOC’Y PETROLEUM ENG’RS (Apr. 2005), available at www.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/2005/
04/JPT2005_04_ODC_focus.pdf.
185
Bill Kirton, Gary Wulf & Bill Henderson, Thunder Horse Drilling-Riser Break—The Road
to Recovery, SPE 90628, SPE ANNUAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE & EXHIBITION (Sept. 2004); M.T.
Crichton, K. Lauche & R. Flin, Incident Command Skills in the Management of an Oil Industry
Drilling Incident: A Case Study, 13 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 116 (2005).
186
WEST ENG’G SERVS., SHEAR RAM CAPABILITIES STUDY (2004), available at
www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/; see also Casselman & Chazan, supra note 180, at A1 (discussing this
report).
187
ASSESS THE ACCEPTABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 135, at 36.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
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this kind of pressure problem had, to date, not caused massive leaks
could only be ascribed to industry’s good fortune. 191 One problem that
has featured prominently in the post-disaster narrative has been the
inadequate pressure tests done on the Macondo well the day of the
explosion. The lack of vigilance about pressure levels at the Macondo
well, coupled with the lack of knowledge about the performance of
blowout preventers under varying external pressure levels, was a recipe
for disaster.
As Homeland Security Head Janet Napolitano testified before the
Senate Homeland Security Committee, all of the spill response plans
were based on the “clear . . . assumption that a [blowout preventer]
would never fail.” 192
2.

Lack of Regulation of Shearing Capacity

It seems a basic proposition that the blowout preventer, to deserve
that name, must be capable of cutting the pipes being used in the drilling
process. MMS issued a 2003 regulation purporting to require this
capability by requiring rig operators to certify that their shear rams “are
capable of shearing the drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated
surface pressures.” 193
The 2004 Industry-MMS study posed the question whether, under
the most demanding conditions, the blowout preventer installed on a
given rig could shear the drill pipes used in its particular drilling
program. 194 It also sought to determine the pressures under which the
ram shears could deliver that performance. 195
Given that the shear rams might be a drilling operation’s last line of
defense for safety and environmental protection, one might expect this
question to have been resolved satisfactorily before ultra-deepwater

191

Id.
Gulf Coast Catastrophe: Assessing the Nation’s Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs (May 17, 2010),
available at hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=
393fed6e-f565-4964-a0c7-a2b7a1728f4c (testimony of Janet Napolitano in response to question
from Sen. Joe Lieberman).
193
See 30 C.F.R. § 250.416(e) (Westlaw 2011) (requiring diverter and BOP descriptions to
include information that shows the blind-shear rams installed in the BOP stack (both surface and
subsea stacks) are capable of shearing any drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated surface
pressure). The responsibility to assure that the BOP shear rams can reliably shear the drill pipe in the
particular operational conditions thus rests wholly with the operator—the agency sets no technical
specifications for kinds of equipment to be used at particular depths.
194
WEST ENG’G SERVS., supra note 186.
195
Id. at 1-4.
192
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drilling commenced. Indeed, a 1999 MMS study recommended that
regulations require that safety testing of blowout preventers include
testing with diameters reflecting all the sizes of pipe in use. 196 A decade
later that basic recommendation had yet to be implemented. Instead,
responding to industry requests, MMS actually proposed changing the
regulations to reduce the kinds and frequency of testing and planning it
required. 197 As Rep. Bart Stupak noted at a House Oversight Hearing
Investigating the Role of the Department of Interior in the Deepwater
Horizon Disaster, the agency regulations finalized in 2003 did not
require more redundancy and better backup systems for blowout
preventers, despite multiple consultant reports recommending these
technological improvements. 198 Indeed, the 2003 regulations did not
even require regular testing of backup systems. 199
MMS did not issue testing protocols for determining shear
capability, nor did it specify minimum equipment standards or
requirements. As a result, manufacturers used widely divergent criteria
for reporting of shearing capabilities, 200 making comparisons and
verification difficult. In the 2004 study, only three of fourteen newer
deep-water drilling rigs were actually able to shear pipe at their

196

RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP, supra note 172.
MMS took this step even though industry consultants had been advising for years that
testing increased the reliability of blowout preventers. MICHAEL E. MONTGOMERY, WEST ENG’G
SERVS., TESTING IMPROVES SURFACE BOP EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY (1993), available at
www.westengineer.com/publication/boptesting.pdf. The first relaxation in testing regimens came at
the same time that MMS was commissioning studies to investigate the safety or lack thereof of
blowout preventers. See RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP, supra note 172 (extensively referencing
Phase I of the report, which was issued in 1997). Despite the conclusions its consultants were
providing about the need for inspections, in 1997 MMS proposed doubling the time between
required blowout preventer tests (to two weeks). Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Blowout Preventer (BOP)
Testing Requirements for Drilling and Completion Operations, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,819 (proposed July
15, 1997), available at www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/BOPTesting.PDF. This rule was
finalized the next year. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., Blowout Preventer (BOP) Testing
Requirements for Drilling and Completion Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,605 (June 1, 1998) (codified
at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250), available at www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/Bop.pdf. In 2008, MMS
created exemptions to the testing requirement and relaxed the requirement that lessees provide a
detailed blowout scenario plan, exempting most wells from this requirement. MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
COORDINATION DOCUMENTS, NTL NO. 2008-G04 (Apr. 1, 2008), available at
www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2008NTLs/08-g04.pdf.
198
The Role of the Interior Department in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (July 20, 2010),
available at democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100720/
Stupak.Statement.07.20.2010.pdf (opening statement of Rep. Bart Stupak) [hereinafter Hearing on
the Role of the Interior Department].
199
Id.
200
WEST ENG’G SERVS., supra note 186, at 1-4.
197
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maximum rated water depths. 201 Even worse, despite the regulatory
requirement that operators certify their blowout preventers’ shearing
capabilities, only about half of those rigs’ operators required a shear ram
test during commissioning or acceptance. 202 The consultant characterized
these facts as a “grim snapshot illustrat[ing] the lack of preparedness in
the industry to shear and seal a well with the last line of defense against a
blowout.” 203 Since that time, the problems have only gotten worse as
industry uses thicker, harder-to-cut pipes in order to drill in ever-deeper
water. As evidence mounted that the power of sheer rams was not
keeping up with drilling techniques, 204 MMS failed to issue any safety
alerts or adopt specific requirements for shear ram design to ensure they
were powerful enough to cut the thickest pipe.
The failure to specify adequate standards was then compounded by
a lax enforcement process. One colloquy during the May 2010 Joint U.S.
Coast Guard/Minerals Management Service Investigation hearings on the
disaster captured this problem perfectly. Captain Hung M. Nguyen, the
Coast Guard Representative running the hearing was questioning
Michael Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations in the
Gulf of Mexico.
Speaking about the blowout preventer specifications, Captain
Nguyen asked:
Q: So—I’m sorry. So, my understanding is that it is designed to
industry standard, manufactured by industry, installed by industry with
no government witnessing oversight of the construction or the
installation; is that correct?
A: That would be correct. 205

Or, as Acting Inspector General Mary Kendall noted in her
congressional testimony, “Generally, MMS regulations are heavily
reliant on industry to document and accurately report on operations,
production and royalties.” 206 With no detailed minimum standards for

201

Id. at 2-4.
Id.
203
Id.
204
See, e.g., WEST ENG’G SERVS., supra note 186.
205
USCG/MMS MARINE BD. OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARINE CAS., EXPLOSION, FIRE,
POLLUTION & SINKING OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT DEEPWATER HORIZON, WITH LOSS OF
LIFE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 21-22 APRIL 2010,
at 37 (May 16, 2010),
www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/621931/1/Deepwater%20Horizo
n%20Joint%20Investigation%20Transcript%20-%20May%2012,%202010.pdf.
206
Testimony of Mary L. Kendall, Acting Inspector General for the Dep’t of the Interior,
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res., Subcommittee on Energy & Mineral Res. (June 17, 2010),
202
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blowout preventers, either for secondary back-up, for testing protocols,
or for shear ram capabilities, and no oversight, an industry whose focus
is profit was left to its own judgment.
3.

Failure to Require Additional Safety Devices like Acoustic Triggers

Because blowout preventers are both critical and fallible, other oilproducing countries require an additional layer of protection in the form
of a secondary fail-safe device called an acoustic trigger. 207 This device
is an additional fail-safe, intended to allow remote activation of a
blowout preventer. 208 Acoustic triggers thus offer an additional layer of
protection in cases where a blowout preventer fails to activate. 209 These
devices have been required in the Netherlands since 1993 210 and are
mandatory in Brazil. 211
In 2000, MMS proposed requiring acoustic triggers or another
secondary backup to a blowout preventer on all rigs in U.S. waters. 212
MMS called these devices “an essential component of a deepwater
drilling system.” 213 However, the API marshaled an intense lobbying
effort against the proposal. 214 An industry-sponsored study purported to
demonstrate that acoustic triggers were unreliable and should not be
required. 215 The Cheney Energy Task force dropped the
recommendation, 216 and it was never implemented. An API-promulgated
standard suggested that these devices were optional. 217 In practice this
www.doioig.gov/images/stories/KendallTestimony17June2010.pdf [hereinafter Testimony of Mary
L. Kendall].
207
Gold, Casselman & Chazan, supra note 167.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
NORSOK Standard, DRILLING FACILITIES REV.2, STANDARD 5.10.3.8(3) (July 1998),
available at www.standard.no/PageFiles/1318/D-001.pdf (“When drilling with the BOP system
installed on the seabed, an acoustic or an alternative control system shall in addition be installed.”
(emphasis added)).
211
Gold, Casselman & Chazan, supra note 167.
212
See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., SAFETY ALERT 186: ACCIDENTAL DISCONNECT OF MARINE
DRILLING RISERS (Mar. 3, 2000), available at www.ocsbbs.com/safety/SA_186.asp.
213
Id.
214
Gold, Casselman & Chazan, supra note 167.
215
WEST ENG’G SERVS., EVALUATION OF SECONDARY INTERVENTION METHODS IN WELL
CONTROL (Mar. 2003), available at www.eenews.net/public/25/15454/features/documents/
2010/05/04/document_gw_04.pdf.
216
See Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Sex, Lies and Oil Spills, HUFFPOST (May 5, 2010),
www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-f-kennedy-jr/sex-lies-and-oil-spills_b_564163.html (making this
allegation); see also Mike Papantonio, Weighing Oil Spill’s Impact, THE ED SHOW (Apr. 30, 2010),
available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/36879861#36879861.
217
Am. Petroleum Inst., Specification 16D, § 1.5, Emergency Backup BOP Control Systems
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meant that when Deepwater Horizon’s blowout preventer failed, there
was no back-up technology to prevent an oil leak. Nor was there any
proven means of shutting the then-gushing deepwater well.
The decision not to require acoustic triggers reflected the growing
identity of interests between the drilling industry and the regulators
overseeing their activities. A different regulatory culture, less solicitous
of industry concerns and more focused on protecting the public, might
well have led to a different result. However, this incident reveals
problems beyond agency capture. Assuming for a moment that the API
was correct and acoustic triggers were unreliable, the agency was still
faced with a situation in which the primary safety technology, the
blowout preventer, had a troublingly high failure rate. The agency could
have demanded that offshore drillers come up with a new fail-safe
technology to use in lieu of the acoustic trigger. Doing so would have
required the industry to invest in safety technology and innovation.
However, the OCSLA does not explicitly direct the agency to require
industry to develop new technologies to protect against risks to the
environment. And, in the absence of an express technology-forcing
mandate, the agency was content to pick and choose among available
technologies. That meant that industry, rather than regulators, decided
the level of safety that would be appropriate.
At the Joint Coast Guard/MMS hearing described above, another
colloquy between Captain Nguyen and Michael Saucier revealed the
danger of this approach. Captain Nguyen asked whether there were any
mandatory requirements for rigs to have a secondary, backup activation
system for the blowout preventers.
Q: . . . right now its [secondary backup requirement] is not enforceable
because it’s not in the regulation?
A: Correct.
Q: So, we have no safety notices out there and it’s up to the industry to
comply or not?
A: No, we actually do. We issued a safety alert back in 2000 and also
a note to leasees in 2001 and 2009 to highly encourage them to have a
back up activation system.
Q: Highly encourage, how’s that translate to enforcement?
218
A: There is no enforcement on it.

Instead of requiring that oil drillers develop additional technical

(“When the subsea control system is inaccessible or nonfunctional, an independent control system
may be used to operate critical well control and/or disconnect functions.”).
218
Id. at 43-44.
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fixes, or another layer of safety protection, regulators simply accepted
industry contentions that the acoustic trigger was unreliable and dropped
the issue entirely. Had the MMS instead withheld approval to proceed
until the industry developed technologies or operation techniques to
protect against the known, significant risk that blowout preventer failures
posed, it would have created a tremendous incentive for the development
of new safety technologies.
ii.

Failure to Require Adequate Spill Response Plans

On paper, this regulatory regime for spill planning and prevention
was rigorous. At each stage of the offshore drilling process, regulators
must comply with NEPA, beginning with the approval of a nationwide 5Year OCS Leasing Program 219 and ending with approving the
decommissioning of individual wells. 220 As part of this process, MMS
promulgated regulations required extensive information about spill
response preparation. 221 Lessees were directed to submit spill response
plans that included a worst-case discharge scenario, including the
location of equipment and the names of primary spill response
contractors. 222 These regulations required that, at the exploration stage,
the company identify a worst-case scenario with considerable specificity,
including the highest volume of oil that could be released, the maximum
flow rate and duration, the likelihood that an uncontrolled spill could be
arrested, and the time it would take to dig a relief well, 223 as well as
information about financing and technology. 224
However, other portions of those regulations gave MMS the
discretion to limit the information it required from lessees. 225 MMS took
219

An OCS Leasing Program is the schedule of oil and gas lease sales (including the size,
timing, and location of proposed leasing activity) that the Secretary determines will best balance the
nation’s energy needs with environmental and social considerations for the five-year period
following its approval. See OCSLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Westlaw 2011). Before an area can be
offered for leasing, it must be included in the current five-year program. The current five-year
leasing program can be found at www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2012LeaseSaleSchedule.htm.
220
NEPA applies to all major federal actions, including decommissioning a well. See, e.g.,
BOEMRE, REGIONAL IMPORTANCE OF MANMADE STRUCTURES AS ROCKFISH NURSERIES (2010),
available at www.boemre.gov/eppd/PDF/EPPDStudies/RegionalImportanceManmadeStructures.pdf
(referring to compliance with NEPA in the decommissioning process).
221
30 C.F.R. §§ 250.201(a), 250.202 (Westlaw 2011).
222
30 C.F.R. § 250.219 (Westlaw 2011); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.243(h) (Westlaw 2011).
223
30 C.F.R. § 250.243(h) (Westlaw 2011).
224
Id.
225
See 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(c) (Westlaw 2011). This section gives the Regional Director
discretion to limit the amount of information a lessee must provide when “(1) Sufficient applicable
information or analysis is readily available to MMS; (2) Other coastal or marine resources are not
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full advantage of this discretion, issuing Notices to Lessees (NTL) that
dramatically limited the scale and kinds of information required to
accompany drilling plans. 226 In particular, MMS gave industry a pass
with regard to a response to blowouts and estimating worst-case
discharge scenarios, allowing general regional estimates to replace
detailed analyses targeting specific wells, and exempting some wells
entirely. 227
Although the Oil Pollution Act requires that the owner or operator
of a tank vessel or facility “prepare and submit . . . a plan for responding,
to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge,” 228 MMS
similarly whittled down its regulatory powers. It did so by interpreting
this broad statutory obligation narrowly and tying spill response
obligations to “the limitations of available technology.” 229 Thus the
lessee’s responsibilities are limited to using available technology
regardless of whether available technology can adequately protect the
environment. 230 There is no requirement that a lessee ensure that
adequate technology exists to respond to potential spills. This regulatory
framework creates a perverse incentive. Because there is no obligation to
develop more advanced technologies capable of cleaning up more oil,
and because the development of such technologies creates increased
cleanup obligations, there is an incentive for companies not to develop
better cleanup technologies, lest they increase their cleanup obligations.
The OCSLA provides that an exploration plan may be rejected if it
will “probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and
other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not
leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or

present or affected; (3) Other factors such as technological advances affect information needs; or (4)
Information is not necessary or required for a State to determine consistency with their CZMA
Plan.” Id.
226
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERAL MGMT. SERV., GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION,
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
COORDINATION DOCUMENTS (Apr. 1, 2008), available at www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/
regs/ntls/2008NTLs/08-g04.pdf.
227
Id.
228
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. § 2701 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
229
30 C.F.R. § 254.6 (Westlaw 2011) (defining “Maximum extent practicable” to mean
“within the limitations of available technology”).
230
The recent report by the OCS Safety Oversight Board noted an additional flaw: oil spill
response plans “are designed to deal with surface oil cleanup, not containment and control of wells
at the spill’s source.” See OUTER CONT’L SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR (Sept. 1, 2010),
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=43677
[hereinafter REPORT TO KEN SALAZAR].
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human environment.” 231 Duly promulgated regulations direct MMS to
“evaluate fully the potential effect of leasing on the human, marine and
coastal environments, and develop measures to mitigate adverse impacts,
including lease stipulations.” 232 Unfortunately, the agency has only thirty
days in which to make such a determination.233 Thirty days is not enough
time to prepare an adequate EA or EIS. The agency is forced by this
artificially short deadline to make critical decisions on the basis of more
generic documents 234 prepared for earlier stages of the leasing process,
rather than on site-specific information prepared with regard to the
particular wells under consideration. The Council on Environmental
Quality encourages this practice by directing agencies to tier the
environmental analyses required under NEPA. 235 The theory is that such
an approach will avoid repetitive discussions of the same issues, but
realistically the practice of tiering, as done for offshore drilling, means
there is rarely any serious consideration of site-specific environmental
concerns or the cumulative effects of multiple leases. 236 With no time for
adequate environmental review, the agency routinely used categorical
exemptions to waive the need for rigorous environmental review in the
form of EAs or EISs under NEPA. 237
Lessees know that the agency will not have enough time to do a
thorough investigation of environmental impacts. 238 They also know that
going through the motions of environmental planning, creating
meaningless documents crammed with recycled and inaccurate
information, is likely to go undetected. 239 When the limitations on
231

43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(2) (Westlaw 2011); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (Westlaw 2011).
30 C.F.R. § 256.26(b) (Westlaw 2011).
233
43 U.S.C.A. §§1340, 1334(a)(2)(c) (Westlaw 2011).
234
30 C.F.R. § 250.232(c) (Westlaw 2011).
235
See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (Westlaw 2011).
236
See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-00008-JKS (D. Alaska Sept.
25, 2006) (finding that the agency failed to adequately consider cumulative effects in approving
leases).
237
This problem has an easy and obvious solution. If Congress amended the OCSLA to
remove or extend this short time limit, the agency would have the time to conduct a full
environmental analysis. For a discussion of this point, see ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY BLOWOUT: HOW REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP
DISASTER POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED TO AVOID A RECURRENCE 18-19 (2010),
available at www.progressivereform.org/articles/BP_Reg_Blowout_1007.pdf.
238
For example, prior to the congressional hearings, regulators seemed not to have noticed
that many different companies had submitted identical spill response plans, complete with identical
errors.
239
For a discussion of the NEPA failures associated with MMS’s review of BP’s Macondo
filings, see Sandra B. Zellmer, Robert L. Glicksman & Joel A. Mintz, Throwing Precaution to the
Wind: NEPA and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2011),
available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1760425; see also Mike Soraghan, NEPA
232
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agency review associated with time pressures are coupled with the
perverse agency policy deterring the development of more advanced
cleanup technology, the incentives for industry are clear.
This is a regulatory scheme that encourages stagnation. By tying the
lessees’ spill prevention and cleanup obligations to existing technologies,
MMS created a perverse incentive for industry not to develop better
technologies. Had MMS keyed spill response requirements to standards
based on avoiding negative environmental impacts, the regulatory
incentives would be toward innovation. The Coast Guard flagged this
problem, warning in 2002 that:
Improved mechanical and non-mechanical recovery technologies . . .
are not generally available and without requirements in place to
require use of new response technologies, they will not be developed
and deployed adequately. . . . Without a requirement to have these
technologies, there is little incentive for plan holders to invest in them
and therefore, little incentive for technology companies to develop or
refine these technologies further. 240

Subsequent events in the Gulf showed how prescient this Coast
Guard warning had been. Despite representations that it had response
technology on hand to respond to a spill, it took BP weeks to construct
its first attempt at a solution, which it dubbed “the dome.” 241 Regulators
had never inquired beyond the bland assurances about “proven
equipment and technology” to find out what “proven technologies”
offshore drillers actually had at their disposal. 242 As a result, when
disaster struck, BP found itself in the unenviable position of having to
wing it. 243
Reviews Could Stall Return of Offshore Drilling Projects in Deep Water, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011,
available at www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/03/03greenwire-nepa-reviews-could-stall-return-ofoffshore-dr-20907.html (noting that a full EIS requires eight to nine months, not thirty days).
240
U.S. COAST GUARD, 2002 SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AFTER ACTION REPORT 22
(Dec. 13, 2002), available at www.uscg.mil/history/docs/2002SONSAARfinalReport.pdf. Vice
Admiral Thad Allen was the National Incident Commander for this simulation. Id. at 1.
241
Subsequent technologies deployed to stop the spill (which also failed) were called “top
hat,” “junk shot,” and “top kill.” These also had to be constructed after the spill.
242
When asked why they did not have such equipment already on hand in the Gulf, BP
managers explained that a blowout had been “inconceivable.” Indeed, it was an open secret in the
industry that nobody knew how to stop a deep-sea leak. Shell Oil admitted as much in a 2000
Environmental Assessment filed with MMS. See BLOCKS 158 & 202, supra note 99, at app. D 3-4
(Shell received the permit anyway).
243
Guy Chazan & Jim Carlton, The Gulf Oil Spill: BP Wasn’t Prepared for Leak, CEO Says,
WALL ST. J. at A.5 (May 14, 2010) (quoting Tony Hayward admitting that rather than having
“capabilit[ies] that we could have available to deploy instantly,” the company had been “creating it
as we go”).
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THE PROBLEM OF SHORT-CHANGING NEPA

In its programmatic EIS for drilling in the Western Gulf of Mexico,
a requirement under the NEPA, MMS downplayed the risk of blowouts
as negligible and easily addressed by modern technology. 244 Citing what
it called “an increasingly effective campaign of positive prevention and
preparedness initiatives,” MMS concluded that spills would be unlikely.
The agency further projected that if any spills did occur, they would be
“primarily short-term and localized in nature.” 245
This discussion from 2000 FONSI is typical of how MMS
approached its regulatory task vis-à-vis spills. Shell proposed a drilling
project it dubbed “Brutus” in water 2958 feet deep. 246 It submitted an EA
that candidly stated the risks associated with a deepwater blowout:
Although not a new potential source of spills, the likelihood of spills
from loss of control (blowouts) in deep water may be different from
the risk of spills in shallow water. Further investigation is required
before the consequences of blowouts in deep water can be fully
evaluated. Of particular concern is the ability to stop well control loss
once it begins, thus limiting the size of a spill. Regaining well control
in deep water may be a problem since it could require the operator to
cap and control well flow at the seabed in great water depths (in this
instance, over 2,958 feet) and could require simultaneous fire-fighting
247
efforts at the surface.

In issuing a FONSI under NEPA, 248 MMS indicated that “potential
impacts from an accidental release of oil from a high-volume blowout
are a concern,” 249 but comforted itself with the fact that “it is rare for
such a pollution event to occur,” and that by regulation it required well
control and blowout prevention equipment, procedures, and
inspections. 250 The agency also noted that the company had access to
skimming equipment that could further mitigate the potential impacts
244

MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND
GAS LEASE SALES: 2007-2012, at 4-379 (Apr. 2007), www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-018Vol1.pdf.
245
Id.
246
See BLOCKS 158 & 202, supra note 99.
247
Id.
248
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL § 15.4(10) (May 27, 2004),
available at elips.doi.gov/app_dm/act_getfiles.cfm?relnum=3625 [hereinafter DEPARTMENTAL
MANUAL].
249
See BLOCKS 158 & 202, supra note 99, at iii. All references in this paragraph of text are to
this document.
250
Id.
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from an oil spill. 251 The agency’s entire analysis of spill potential and
prevention was contained in one brief paragraph. When the regulatory
decisionmakers are convinced there is virtually no possibility of a
blowout, there is little prospect of rigorous oversight. 252 Consistent with
its assumption that blowouts would not occur, MMS had virtually no
regulations prescribing how to investigate such an occurrence. 253
Beginning in 2004, MMS took this perspective to its logical
extreme and started issuing “categorical exclusions” to exempt all oil
development in the Western Gulf of Mexico from further environmental
review altogether, unless the activity was unusually risky or near an area
of “high biological sensitivity.” 254 MMS identified the “extraordinary
circumstances” that would bar categorical exclusions as explorations in
areas of high seismic risk, in untested waters, on bottoms with hazardous
conditions, within or near sensitive wildlife areas, or using new or
unusual technology. 255 Council on Environmental Quality regulations
allow “categorical exclusions” from the NEPA process for categories of
activities determined to have “no significant impact either individually or
cumulatively” on the environment. 256 However, categorical exclusions
are supposed to be reserved for routine activities with “minimal to
nonexistent” impacts. Inherently risky activities like deep-water drilling
do not fall within that purview. 257
251

Id.
DeParle, supra note 133 (describing two instances in which MMS lead officials stated
there was no possibility of a deepwater blowout. One of those instances was in response to a direct
question by the agency’s head of environmental division about the possibilities of a blowout. The
official response was reportedly “it is impossible,”).
253
See REPORT TO KEN SALAZAR, supra note 230; see also Testimony of Mary L. Kendall,
supra note 206.
254
DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, supra note 248, at 5.4(C)(10).
255
Id.
256
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (Westlaw 2011) (agency procedures for granting these exclusions
relied on “extraordinary circumstances” when an exclusion would not apply).
257
Those limitations were rescinded by the BOEMRE in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. See BUREAU OF ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS,
NTL NO. 2010-N06 (June 18, 2010), available at www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/
ntls/2010NTLs/10-n06.pdf. As of mid-June 2010, lessees must now submit “a scenario for the
potential blowout” that includes “the estimated flow rate, total volume, and maximum duration of
the potential blowout.” Id. at 2. Lessees are also directed to predict “the likelihood for surface
intervention to stop the blowout” as well as to “[s]pecify as accurately as possible the time it would
take to contract for a rig, move it onsite, and drill a relief well.” Id. Yet, even as oil was flowing into
the Gulf, the agency was still issuing categorical exclusions. A number of environmental groups are
suing over this practice, because it limits the agency’s ability to consider alternatives with regard to
drilling in an environmentally responsible fashion. See also DeParle, supra note 133 (quoting Kieran
Suckling, executive director of the Center for Biological Diversity, “What’s missing when you do a
252
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Thus, it is not surprising that when BP repeatedly predicted “little
risk” of a spill, 258 and minimal impacts should one occur, due to
“currents and microbial degradation” 259 and the “capability of adult fish
and shellfish to avoid a spill,” 260 the agency did not blink. 261 Because BP
started from the assumption that “[i]t was unlikely that an accidental oil
spill release would occur from the proposed activities” 262 it could
casually claim in its Exploration Plan that “no adverse impacts to marine
and pelagic birds,” 263 marine mammals, 264 sea turtles, 265 fisheries, 266
beaches, 267 or wetlands 268 would be expected as the result of its
activities. BP offered the blanket assurance that “[i]n the event of an
unanticipated blowout resulting in an oil spill, it is unlikely to have an
impact based on industry-wide standards for using proven equipment and
technology for such responses.” 269 BP reaffirmed that it had the
capability to respond to a worst-case spill of hundreds of thousands of
barrels per day. 270
In this, BP was following standard industry practices of offering
hollow assurances of no or minimal harm, offering no support for those
claims and then moving on. In fact, there was no proven cleanup
technology, there was no cleanup equipment, proven or otherwise, and,
of course, the effects of the spill were monumental.
After the spill, it became clear that BP’s Regional Oil Spill
Response Plan for the Gulf 271 was riddled with omissions and glaring
errors. 272 In this, it was no different from the spill response plans

categorical exclusion is the chance to consider alternative techniques. . . . You say there is only one
option — the preferred option of the oil industry.”).
258
BP EXPLORATION & PROD., INC., INITIAL EXPLORATION PLAN: MISSISSIPPI CANYON
BLOCK
252,
OCS-G
32306
§
14.2.1.5
(Feb.
2009),
available
at
www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/PLANS/29/29977.pdf.
259
Id.
260
Id. § 14.2.1.6.
261
Id. § 14.2.3.
262
Id. § 14.2.1.5.
263
Id. § 14.2.2.1.
264
Id. § 14.2.1.7.
265
Id. § 14.2.1.8.
266
Id. § 14.2.1.5.
267
Id. § 14.2.3.1.
268
Id. § 14.2.3.21.5.
269
Id. § 14.2.2.
270
Id. at 7-1.
271
PLAN
BP
GULF
OF
MEXICO
REGIONAL
RESPONSE
(2009),
www.boemre.gov/DeepwaterHorizon/BP_Regional_OSRP_Redactedv2.pdf.
272
Holbrook Mohr, Justin Pritchard & Tamara Lush, BP Spill Response Plans Severely Flawed,
MSNBC.COM (June 9, 2010), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37599810/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/t/bp-spill-
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submitted by Exxon, Shell, Conoco, and Chevron as part of their
applications to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. 273 The plans contained
identical assurances that a spill was unlikely and, should the unlikely
occur, could be easily contained. 274 The plans even contained identical
errors— references to long-dead experts, 275 incorrect web addresses, 276
and the assurance that a spill would not harm Pacific walrus
populations. 277 Given that the nearest walrus population was quite far
away, this was the only assurance of no harm that the companies could
be confident of delivering in the event of a spill. Henry Waxman called
them “cookie cutter” plans. 278 All had been prepared by the same
consultant 279 and contained verbatim assurances about the lack of
environmental impacts. 280 With a significant component of the
regulatory process reduced to pro forma paper pushing, it is no wonder
that approvals in the Gulf occurred with lightning speed. More critically,
that meant that all the other major oil companies were just as unprepared
as BP had been to respond to a major spill.
Even Tony Hayward, CEO of BP during the Gulf Oil disaster,
acknowledged that “it was entirely fair criticism to say that BP was not
prepared for a deep-water oil leak.” 281 He acknowledged that BP, “did
not have “the tools you would want in your tool-kit.” 282 These comments
response-plans-severely-flawed/ (documenting errors).
273
All of the plans, with their virtually identical covers and virtually identical content, can be
found at Identical Oil Spill Response Plans, PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE (June 18, 2010),
publicintelligence.net/identical-oil-spill-response-plans/. The site contains a page-by-page
comparison of identical charts, identical planning elements and identical language.
274
Id.
275
BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 271, at F-19 (referring to
Prof. Paul Lutz, who died in 2006). Many of the phone numbers were also incorrect. See also
Associated Press, BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Response Plans Severely Flawed, NOLA.COM (June 9, 2010),
www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/bps_gulf_oil_spill_response_pl.html.
276
BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 271, at 1-74. The website
provided for Marine Spill Response Corp., one of the two firms BP relies on for equipment to clean
a spill, instead links to a defunct Japanese-language page.
277
Id. at 11-7.
278
Drilling Down on America’s Energy Future: Safety, Security, and Clean Energy: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (June 15, 2010),
available at democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100615/
Waxman.Statement.ee.06.15.2010.pdf (opening statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
279
In his opening statement at the June 15, 2010, Energy and Environment Subcommittee
Hearing on the BP Oil Spill, Rep. Henry Waxman noted that all the plans had been prepared by the
same consultant, the Response Group. Id.
280
Id.
281
Ed Crooks, BP ‘Not Prepared’ For Deepwater Spill, Financial Times (June 10, 2010)
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1e0e21c-6e53-11df-ab79-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1SU22kFGr (quoting
Tony Hayward).
282
Id.
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were in stark contrast to what BP had assured the government just a year
before. As part of its permit application seeking approval for its plans to
drill the Macondo well, BP represented that it could recover up to
500,000 barrels of oil a day using standard technology. Subsequent
events instead showed the company improvising on the fly because it did
not have the capacity to deal with a spill flowing at a tenth of that rate.
The discrepancy between BP’s representations and its actual
capacity leads both toward and away from the straightforward
explanation. Yes, BP submitted a deeply flawed Spill Response Plan that
vastly overstated its capacity to respond to a blowout, but so did every
other oil company drilling offshore. None of the other oil companies was
any more capable of responding to a major blowout than BP had been.
And MMS approved them all, accepting industry claims of “proven
technology” without question. 283 During the congressional hearings
investigating the BP catastrophe, Exxon Chairman Rex Tillerson
acknowledged, in response to questioning by Rep. Bart Stupak, that
“[w]hen these things happen, we are not well equipped to deal with
them.” 284 When Rep. Stupak pressed Exxon’s Chairman on this point,
stating, “[N]o matter which one of the oil companies here before us had a
blowout, the resources are not enough to prevent what we are seeing day
after day in the Gulf,” the answer Chairman Tillerson gave was, “[T]hat
is correct.” 285 The companies had mouthed the words needed to clear the
application hurdle, but they had no actual capacity to respond to a worstcase scenario or deliver on the commitments contained in the plan.
Based on API and industry representations, the regulators structured
their regulatory oversight on the mistaken assumption that there was no
chance of a disaster happening. 286 In this, they were guilty of what
Richard Feynman described, in the wake of the Challenger disaster, as
“gradually fooling [themselves] while degrading standards.” 287 Because
the agency was convinced that there was almost no risk of an adverse
event, there was little incentive to engage in rigorous oversight. 288
283

Mike Soraghan, Industry Claims of “Proven” Technology Went Unchallenged at MMS,
GREENWIRE (June 2, 2010), www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2010/06/02/1.
284
Jonathan Tilove, Safety of Deepwater Drilling Debated in Hearing on Capitol Hill,
NOLA.COM (June 15, 2010), www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/
safety_of_deepwater_drilling_d.html.
285
Id.
286
Drilling Down on America’s Energy Future, Safety Security and Clean Energy: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (June 15, 2010) (statement
of Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairman), available at democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
documents/20100615/Markey.Statement.ee.06.15.2010.pdf.
287
FEYNMAN, supra note 1.
288
DeParle, supra note 133 (describing two instances in which MMS lead officials stated
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Consistent with its assumption that blowouts would not occur, MMS had
virtually no regulations prescribing how to investigate such an
occurrence. 289 The National Commission found that there had been no
improvement in spill response technology in at least twenty years despite
all the advances in offshore drilling. 290 This is not a new revelation
available only in hindsight. The Coast Guard had warned in 2002 that
industry’s drilling and exploration abilities vastly exceeded its safety and
cleanup capacity, and that this situation would not change unless the
government insisted, through regulatory commands, that industry
develop the missing cleanup and response technologies. 291 The agency
did not follow through on its responsibilities.
As a result, while technology for drilling leapfrogged ahead, BP
relied on the same rudimentary cleanup technology that had been
inadequate to respond to the Exxon Valdez spill twenty years earlier. 292
The same dispersant, Corexit, was used, despite no demonstration that
dispersing oil helped clean up a spill, and a host of unanswered questions
about the environmental impacts of the dispersant itself. The booms used
to contain the oil spill with what the Commission called “limited effect”
were virtually identical to the spill response technology developed during
World War II to contain spilled oil. 293 Seventy years later, the same
rudimentary technology was still in use. More than four million feet of
booms were deployed in the Gulf while the Macondo well was spewing
its oil. 294 The boom, a mixture of hard and sorbent boom, was intended
to protect environmentally sensitive lands like wildlife refuges, estuaries,
beaches, and marshes from contamination. 295 Its success was at best
mixed. Despite a massive boom deployment, thousands of miles of Gulf

there was no possibility of a deepwater blowout. One of those instances was in response to a direct
question by the agency’s head of environmental division about the possibilities of a blowout. The
official response was reportedly “it is impossible.”).
289
See REPORT TO KEN SALAZAR, supra note 230; see also Testimony of Mary L. Kendall,
supra note 206.
290
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 269-70.
291
U.S. COAST GUARD, 2002 SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AFTER ACTION REPORT 22
(Dec. 13, 2002), available at www.uscg.mil/history/docs/2002SONSAARfinalReport.pdf.
292
For a description of the inadequacy of clean up technology in the context of the Exxon
Valdez spill, see H.R. REP. NO. 101-242, Part 3: Committee on Science, Space and Technology 235,
reproduced in OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 233 (1991).
293
Oil
Spill
Report,
ENERGYNOW!
(Jan.
16,
2011),
available
at
www.energynow.com/node/2906#.
294
More than 1.5 Million Feet of Hard Boom Recovered from Coastal Waters,
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Aug. 23, 2010), www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/23/more-15million-feet-hard-boom-recovered-coastal-waters.
295
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., USING BOOM IN RESPONSE TO OIL SPILLS
(May 18, 2010), available at www.noaa.gov/factsheets/new%20version/boom.pdf.
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coastlines were despoiled with oil, destroying livelihoods and threatening
marine life. 296 And there is no evidence that booms can be effective in
the choppy, open seas associated with deepwater drilling. 297
There is no great mystery here. Drilling technology advanced
because there is a private value attached to extraction technology—its
development meant that oil companies could generate profits from new
resources. Development of these technologies is thus an investment in
future profits. Safety and cleanup technology, on the other hand, has
typically been marked down on the expense side of the ledger—
something to be minimized whenever possible. Private incentives
favored investing in extraction technology rather than in safety
technology. This disconnect between the private incentives of profit and
the overall public good is a primary justification for regulation.
In addition to the statutory and regulatory deficiencies identified
above, there are two other primary considerations in grappling with the
complex explanation for the BP disaster. The hollowing out of
government, through lack of resources, and a revolving door 298 between
industry and government also contributed significantly to the problems
identified above.

296

For a vivid photographic documentation of the devastated Gulf coastline, including oil
floating around booms and oiled animals, see Oil Reaches Louisiana Shores, BOSTON.COM (May 24,
2010), www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/05/oil_reaches_louisiana_shores.html. In the hardest-hit
state, Louisiana, 3086 miles coastline still await clean up (including marshes and beaches), with an
additional 1598 miles of beach targeted for cleanup in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. See Mark
Schleifstein, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Continues to Foul 168 Miles of Louisiana Coastline,
NOLA.COM (Dec. 30, 2010), www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/12/
gulf_of_mexico_oil_spill_conti.html. The environmental and economic losses are staggering.
297
Cain Burdeau & Holbrook Mohr, Document; BP Did Not Plan For Major Oil Spill ABC
NEWS.COM (April 30, 2010), available at timeswv.com/headlinenews/x1271726704/BP-didn-t-planfor-major-oil-spill (describing how boom fails in choppy water). This is an even more pressing issue
in Alaska, where ice, rough seas and lack of manpower mean that industry projections about the
effectiveness of boom to contain an oil spill are highly improbable. A recent, relatively small spill
(up to 800 gallons) in Norway provided a preview of the challenges of trying to contain an oil spill
in icy waters. AFP, Up to 200 Birds Injured off Norway After Spill (Feb. 20, 2011), available at
www.france24.com/en/20110220-200-birds-injured-off-norway-after-spill (describing how sea ice
inhibited boom effectiveness and how sub-zero temperatures prevented workers from responding
fully to the disaster). For photographs of boom rendered ineffective by sea ice, see Caitlin Leutwiler,
Norwegian Oil Spill Proves Fears of Arctic Drilling Disaster, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE (Mar. 4,
2011), available at www.defendersblog.org/2011/03/norwegian-oil-spill-proves-fears-of-arcticdrilling-disaster/.
298
This problem is not unique to regulation of offshore drilling. Indeed, in the context of the
banking crisis, astute observers have repeatedly noted the corrupting influence of this phenomenon.
See Simon Johnson, The Ruinous Fiscal Impact of Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, available at
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/the-ruinous-fiscal-impact-of-big-banks/?hp (complaining
that “a well-regarded regulator can and often does go work for a bank afterward”).
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Hollow Government: Lack of Resources

The number of producing deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico
increased from sixty-five in 1985 to more than 600 in 2009. 299 According
to a 2007 management report submitted, in the twenty-five years
between 1982 and 2007, OCS leasing increased by 200% and oil
production has increased by 185%. 300 At the same time, MMS staffing
resources decreased by 36%. 301 In his opening statement at the House
Oversight Hearing on the Role of the Department of Interior in the
Deepwater Horizon Disaster, the Committee’s Chair, Rep. Bart Stupak,
noted that the number of federal inspectors stagnated, even as the
complexity and number of wells, not to mention the distance that must be
traveled to reach them, increased. 302 In 1985, MMS had fifty-five
inspectors. 303 In spring 2010, Acting Department of the Interior Inspector
General, Mary Kendall, testified before the House Committee on Natural
Resources that there were sixty inspectors for the almost 4000 facilities
in the Gulf of Mexico region. 304 She contrasted this situation with the
Pacific Coast, which has ten inspectors for only twenty-three facilities. 305
Agency personnel were not only overwhelmed, they were also underresourced, with a 2010 budget that was roughly equivalent to the
agency’s budget in the 1980s—before overseeing deepwater drilling was
added to its oversight portfolio. 306 As a result, MMS was hard-pressed to
keep talented employees who could earn twice as much working for
industry. 307 Indeed, the agency did not even have a budget adequate to
provide the transportation necessary to conduct surprise inspections of
deepwater rigs. 308 With the agency dependent on industry for
299

A list of deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico can be found at the BOEMRE website,
www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/deepwtr.html.
300
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFSHORE MINERALS MANAGEMENT BUSINESS
ASSESSMENT AND ALIGNMENT REPORT (May 2007), www.noia.org/website/
navdispatch.asp?id=40069.
301
Id.
302
Hearing on the Role of the Interior Department, supra note 198.
303
Id.
304
Testimony of Mary L. Kendall, supra note 206.
305
Id.
306
See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 290.
307
John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, Regulation of Offshore Rigs Is a Work in Progress,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/us/politics/17regulate.html.
308
Of course, official agency policy also evinced a lack of inclination to conduct these
inspections. See Russell Gold, Inspectors Rarely Surprised Oil Rigs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11. 2010,
available at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703358504575544294191
404032.html?mod=WSJ_WSJ_US_News_5#articleTabs%3Darticle (reporting that there have been
no surprise inspections on deepwater production platforms since 2004 and that, in contravention of
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transportation to the rigs in order to do inspections, it was not possible to
make inspections a priority, 309 and it was next to impossible for the
agency to do its job of enforcing safety and environmental standards.
This was not the only example of how hollow government hurt the
agency. Along the same lines, after the 2004 Spill of National
Significance simulation, the Coast Guard noted that “[o]il spill response
personnel did not appear to have even a basic knowledge of the
equipment required to support salvage or spill cleanup operations.” 310
ii.

Agency Culture

Even had MMS had adequate funding and staffing, it would still
have been faced with hopelessly conflicting regulatory tasks. Wearing its
licensing hat, the agency leased sites for drilling and production; wearing
its revenue collection hat, the agency assessed royalty payments based on
the value of the oil and gas produced at those sites; wearing its regulator
hat, the agency set environmental and safety standards; and wearing yet
another hat, this time enforcement, the agency was tasked with
overseeing production to ensure it complied with those environmental
and safety standards. 311 To the extent that enforcing those environmental
and safety standards might slow or stall unsafe production, thereby
reducing royalties, there was a clear tension between the revenue
collection task and the regulatory enforcement task. Given that the day
before the spill, Congress was claiming that revenues collected from
offshore drilling would top $40 billion over the five years, 312 and given
the national security priority of increasing domestic oil production, many
of the agency’s incentives lined up neatly with furthering the cozy

law, internal agency policies prohibited surprise inspections).
309
See Hearing on the Role of the Interior Department, supra note 198.
310
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. COAST GUARD, CALIFORNIA SONS 04 AFTER ACTION
REPORT 47 (Sept. 10, 2004), available at www.uscg.mil/history/docs/
2004SONSAfterActionReport.pdf.
311
Indeed, one highly trumpeted reform in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster
was the transformation of MMS into three distinct agencies in order to eliminate the conflicts
inherent in these multiple missions. Under the reorganization, MMS was divided into the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, which has responsibility for planning, permitting and leasing; the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, which has responsibility for oversight, safety and
environmental protection of offshore oil operations; and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
which has responsibility for collecting royalties and revenues. See Mark Jaffe, Drilling Agency MMS
Split into 3, DENVER POST, May 20, 2010, available at www.denverpost.com/news/ci_15121932.
312
Ben Geman, Senior Dems Warn Against Sharing Offshore Drilling Revenue with States,
THE HILL’S ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 11:42 AM ET),
thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/93011-senior-dems-warn-against-devasating-offshoredrilling-revenue-plans-in-climate-bill.
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relationship between the regulators and industry. The revenue-generating
function created a powerful disincentive to delay or deny approval of
permits for further environmental investigation even when the proposed
drilling posed risks to sensitive environments, and an even bigger
deterrent to shutting down wells, even when they were being operated in
an unsafe manner. Inspections were infrequent, and there are multiple
reports of industry completing inspection forms for the inspectors. 313
MMS took pride in the fact that Gulf offshore wells went from
discovery to production in sixty-eight months—just over half the 116
months it took in the European Union, and significantly less than the
global average of eighty months. 314 A high-level MMS employee
described sending a message to industry of “let the good times roll.” 315
One district manager succinctly summed up the problem in conversations
with investigators. “Obviously we’re all oil industry,” 316 he said of the
regulators and the industry they were tasked with supervising:
We’re all from the same part of the country. Almost all of our
inspectors have worked for oil companies out on these platforms.
They grew up in the same towns. Some of these people, they’ve been
friends with all their life. They’ve been with these people since they
were kids. They’ve hunted together. They fish together. 317

This blurring of the roles between regulated and regulator produced what
acting Inspector General Mary Kendall called “egregious misconduct” by
MMS employees. 318 Inspectors were routinely treated to golf
tournaments, hunting trips, fishing expeditions, sporting tickets and other
expensive “perks” by the oil companies MMS was supposed to be
regulating. 319 Indeed, MMS had developed so pervasive a culture of
deference to corporate interests that agency staff failed even to recognize
unethical, inappropriate, and unlawful behavior in many cases. As part of
an investigation of corruption in MMS’s Lake Charles, Louisiana, office,
Office of Inspector General investigators heard a consistent refrain of
313

See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT,
ISLAND OPERATING COMPANY
ET
AL.
7
(Mar.
31,
2010),
available
at
www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/IslandOperatingCo.pdf [hereinafter DOI INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT].
314
LEHNER & DEANS, supra note 40, at 101.
315
DeParle, supra note 133 (quoting MMS official Chris Oynes describing a 1997 lease sale
in Louisiana).
316
DOI INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 311, at 3.
317
Id.
318
Testimony of Mary Kendall, supra note 206.
319
DOI INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 311, at 3.
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“everybody was doing it.” 320 The recent reports by the Department of the
Interior Inspector General and OCS Safety Oversight Board have amply
documented how the agency’s culture became corrupted. 321 The
substantive impacts of these dynamics were significant. 322 Scientists at
MMS complained that managers changed or minimized findings about
potential environmental impact findings in NEPA documents in order to
expedite plan approvals. 323 Indeed, there were widespread complaints
that MMS managers believed the result of NEPA evaluations should
always be a green light to proceed. 324
MMS is no stranger to this sort of conflict. In 2007, a sex-andbribery scandal at MMS’s Denver office exploded across the front pages
of newspapers around the country. 325 Commenting on this situation in a
May 2010 press conference, President Obama described the problem
thusly: “For years, there has been a scandalously close relationship
between the oil companies and the agency that regulates them. . . .[The
oil and gas companies] have effectively been allowed to regulate
themselves.” 326
IV. LESSONS LEARNED
As an entity, BP has an abysmal safety record. However, the Gulf
oil spill did not happen in a vacuum. It occurred in a heavily regulated
industry theoretically required to meet stringent environmental and safety
standards. BP purportedly met all of those standards. An ironic side-note
to the Macondo blowout was MMS’s scramble to delay and then
ultimately cancel its plan to award BP its 2010 Industry Safety Award.

320

Id.
Id; see also REPORT TO KEN SALAZAR, supra note 230.
322
DOI INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 311, at 2-6.
323
OUTER CONT’L SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 230, at 20.
324
For example, one agency scientist told the New York Times, “You simply are not allowed
to conclude that the drilling will have an impact. . . . If you find the risks of a spill are high or you
conclude that a certain species will be affected, your report gets disappeared in a desk drawer and
they find another scientist to redo it or they rewrite it for you.” Ian Urbina, U.S. Said to Allow
Drilling Without Needed Permits, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, available at
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14agency.html?_r=1.
325
See, e.g., Interior Dept. Scandal: Sex, Drugs, Energy Deals Probed at Denver Office,
DENVER POST, Sept. 10, 2008, available at www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_10428441;
Derek Kravitz & Mary Pat Flaherty, Report Says Oil Agency Ran Amok, WASH. POST, Sept. 11,
2008, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/
AR2008091001829.html. A September 2008 Inspector General’s report implicated more than a
dozen employees in the Denver royalty-in-kind office in unethical and criminal conduct.
326
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on the Gulf Oil Spill (May 27,
2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-gulf-oil-spill.
321
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It should come as no surprise that the oil industry is more eager to
invest in extraction technology than in safety and containment. Society
has long recognized the conflict between private and public interests with
regard to protecting the environment, worker health, and a host of other
key public policy choices. 327 Private actors left to their own devices have
little incentive to protect public goods or to protect the public against
many health, safety, and environmental externalities created by their
private, profit-making activities. This tendency is even more pronounced
when private actors capture all of the benefit associated with an activity,
like the new drilling enabled by deepwater technology, but bear only a
fractional share of the costs associated with the lack of adequate safety
and cleanup technology.
Given these incentives, it was entirely predictable that the
companies engaged in deepwater drilling were likely to focus their
resources on developing new extraction technologies without a parallel
investment in safety and containment. The National Commission
emphasized this point and echoed the Coast Guard’s 2002 warning by
writing, “The record shows that without effective government oversight,
the offshore oil and gas industry will not adequately reduce the risk of
accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies.” 328
To rectify this situation, and to bridge the gap between private
incentives and public goods, Congress and state legislatures have enacted
a slew of safety and environmental statutes like the Toxic Substance
Control Act, 329 the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 330 the Clean Air
Act, 331 and the Clean Water Act. 332 These statutes give regulatory
agencies the power to require development and deployment of safety
technologies and processes for which there is no business case but that
are critical to protecting public goods or the public itself. This role for
regulation is particularly important for something like offshore drilling.
Unless the law specifies otherwise, the gains and profits associated with
drilling are concentrated in the hands of the private companies involved,
but the harms and costs of a spill are spread across a wide swath of
society and the environment. As we have seen in the BP oil disaster, as
well as in the banking crisis, this privatization of gains and socialization
of losses creates perverse incentives.
327

Indeed, it was precisely this insight that gave rise to the regulatory state. See, e.g., Robert
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
328
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 217.
329
15 U.S.C.A. § 2605 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
330
29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
331
42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
332
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Westlaw 2011)
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Yet, over the past few decades we have repeatedly been told that
“burdensome regulation” hinders business, with the implication that any
regulation is burdensome. 333 President Reagan campaigned on the idea of
“getting government off our back.” The idea that markets themselves
contained sufficient incentives to prompt private actors to protect the
public and the environment became common currency. 334 Regulators too
began to believe that long-term interests and reputational concerns would
guide corporate actors even in the face of pressures to maximize shortterm profits. From that starting point, it is only a small step to the
conclusion that industry self-regulation can achieve public goals, with
less expense to either the public or to the regulated entities. Thus, the
political consensus for public safeguards to protect our health, safety, and
environment 335 broke down just as companies began employing riskier
technologies and processes. This trend accelerated in the second Bush
Administration when waivers for environmental assessment became
routine. 336
Only now is the nation beginning to reap the “fruits” of an approach
that placed its trust in voluntary, ad hoc actions in place of systemic
formal requirements. Sadly, corporations did exactly what a rational,
value-maximizing individual with no constraints would be predicted to
do—they invested in drilling technology and not in cleanup technology.
The government that was supposed to be the bulwark against unfettered
self-interest failed to force BP and the other oil companies to internalize
the costs they were only too happy to externalize onto the rest of us. In
333

Indeed, a recent Google search of “burdensome regulation” returned over 1.54 million hits.
Popular targets are worker safety regulations, environmental regulations and other health-based
regulations. See, e.g., Gregory Conko & Sam Kazman, Reduce Burdensome Regulation of Medicines
and Medical Devices, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Jan. 19, 2011), cei.org/agenda-congress/reduceburdensome-regulation-medicines-and-medical-devices.
334
See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
(2001).
335
The Clean Air Act and NEPA, for example, were passed with overwhelming bipartisan
support in both the House and the Senate.
336
For example, in just the first six months of 2006, the Bureau of Land Management issued
1361 permits to drill under NEPA categorical exemptions. Dan Berman, Western Govs Seek
Moratorium on NEPA Waivers in Sensitive Habitats, RED LODGE CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 28, 2007),
rlch.org/news/western-govs-seek-moratorium-nepa-waivers-sensitive-habitats. The practice became
so pervasive that the Western Governors’ Association called on the Bush Administration to cease
use of categorical exemptions in crucial wildlife habitats. Id. The Bush Administration also used
NEPA waivers to exempt the border fence with Mexico from environmental review and to greenlight
Navy sonar testing despite concerns about adverse effects on whales and other marine mammals.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Bush Administration to Issue Waivers to Build US-Mexico Border Fence
(Apr. 2, 2008), www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,344790,00.html; Bush Exempts Navy from Court
16, 2008), www.ensOrder Protecting Whales, ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Jan.
newswire.com/ens/jan2008/2008-01-16-02.html.
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the wake of the disaster, we see the oil industry strategizing about how to
head off more and better regulation, and the House of Representatives
proposing to limit environmental review of drilling in Alaska. 337
Given the disaster, some kind of administrative reorganization is
inevitable. Indeed, reorganization has already begun, with MMS being
split into three agencies to separate the royalty generating function from
the permitting function and the regulatory oversight function. 338 This
change makes good sense; the recognition that the agency was hopelessly
conflicted by its dual mandate harkens back to the decision to move
pesticide registration from USDA to EPA for similar reasons. 339 There
are certainly some clear problems with how MMS regulated offshore
drilling that must be addressed. Beyond the highly contextual specifics,
and its unique combination of actors, regulatory reforms proposed or
enacted in response to Deepwater Horizon can offer a window into some
broad and fundamental questions about the nature of the administrative
state. In particular, this catastrophe shines a bright light on the practice of
implicit privatization of the regulatory state. Explicit privatization, the
shrinking of the footprint of the regulatory state in favor of the market, is
a public process and has been the subject of substantial scholarly critique
and public debate. 340 Implicit privatization, by contrast, leaves the
outline of the regulatory state intact but transfers to private parties, sub
rosa, many of the regulatory powers delegated to an agency.
Although that framing of the topic is dramatic, implicit privatization
is not a matter of backroom conspiracy. Rather, most implicit
privatization is simply a function of an overwhelmed or captured agency
relying ever more heavily on its industry “partners.” Across a wide
spectrum of government activities, private actors are increasingly
involved in activities once thought to be the exclusive preserve of
governments. Many scholars and government watchdogs have noted with
alarm that private contractors now play a significant role in planning and

337

Erika Bolstad, House GOP Aims to Reduce EPA Authority over Arctic Drilling,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2011, available at www.adn.com/2011/04/13/1808011/gopaims-to-reduce-epa-authority.html.
338
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, CHANGE OF THE NAME OF
THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
REGULATION
AND
ENFORCEMENT
(June
18,
2010),
available
at
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872; see also
Hearing on the Role of the Interior Department, supra note 198.
339
CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE
10-14 (1987).
340
See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

51

02_BRATSPIES PRINTER VERSION

9/26/2011 1:54:30 PM

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

58

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

operational decision-making for many erstwhile government activities, 341
including basic government activities like writing regulations. The BP
crisis revealed the nature and extent of agency reliance on the oil
industry while in the process emphasizing how much influence industry
had over that most critical of government functions: deciding the level of
acceptable risk in a democratic society. This kind of assessment is at the
core of what the public expects government to be doing. It is one of the
primary governmental responsibilities in a democratic, capitalist society.
Thus it came as something of a shock to discover just how thoroughly
MMS had privatized that task to the American Petroleum Institute
(API). 342
As a private entity, API operates free from many of the legal
obligations imposed on government actors to ensure transparency,
fairness and access. For example, API has no legal obligation to defend
its discretionary decisions under a rationality standard. Yet, API
standards frequently balance risk to the environment against costs to
industry, the quintessential context for a rationality inquiry. Given the
pervasive role that API standards play in offshore drilling, this
accountability gap that is particularly troubling.
API also does not have to set its standards in public the way that an
agency does. API’s rules require only that specifically interested parties
be given notice of a standard-setting initiative, 343 and “specifically
interested” is defined in a fashion that largely excludes the general
public. API’s quest for balance in its standard-setting involves making
sure that manufacturers and users of technology participate equally, 344
but not that all voices be included. This is a very different process from

341

See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005); Dan
Guttman, Contracting United States Government Work: Organizational and Constitutional Models,
3 PUB. ORG. REV. 281 (2003).
342
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, UPDATE OF REVISED AND
REAFFIRMED DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,219 (Apr. 28, 2010),
available
at
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/04/28/2010-9612/update-of-revised-andreaffirmed-documents-incorporated-by-reference; see also Les Blumenthal & Erika Bolstad, U.S.
Agency Let Industry Write Offshore Drilling Rules, MCCLATCHY (May 10, 2010),
www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/10/93859/us-agency-lets-oil-industry-write.html.
343
AM. PETROLEUM INST., PROCEDURES FOR STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT § 7.1 (2006),
mycommittees.api.org/standards/Reference/apistndrdsdevlpmntprcdrs.pdf (“Participation in API
standards activities is open to all parties (persons and organizations) that have a direct and material
interest in the subject of a standard.”).
344
API strives for what it calls “balanced representation,” which consists of one-third
representation for the traditional model of the three interest categories of operator-user,
manufacturer, and general (which means consultants). See id. Notably absent from the list are
affected communities or environmental groups.
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that engaged in by an agency—with widespread public notice and equal
participation opportunities for all. 345
Although API sub-meetings are nominally open to the public, the
public is given neither notice of the meetings nor the opportunity to
participate. 346 The standards that emerge from such a process are likely
to be very different from a process that fully includes the needs, interests
and concerns of the beneficiaries of safety and environmental regulation.
The National Commission concluded that agency adoption of API
standards as the nation’s regulatory safety standards meant that “API’s
shortfalls . . . undermined the entire federal regulatory system.” 347
V.

CONCLUSION

BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster was unprecedented in scope, yet
the failures that led to the catastrophe were eminently predictable. In
fact, they had been repeatedly predicted, although to no avail. Having
watched in frustration as a vital ecosystem was devastated, while BP
tried to spin the disaster away, 348 and industry cheerleaders like Rep.
Barton apologized to the company for the government’s temerity in
demanding compensation, 349 the temptation to point fingers is very
strong. Bad company; greedy industry; corrupt agency—there is plenty
of blame to go around. The now-defunct MMS came in for a massive
portion of that blame. But an honest examination of the complex web of
government and industry interactions makes it clear that it is not enough
merely to blame the regulators themselves for regulatory shortfalls.
While BP bears the brunt of the responsibility for its reckless disregard

345

Section 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act opens participation to the general
public. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c) (Westlaw 2011). Public participation and transparency are widely
considered to be the backbone of legitimacy for public agencies. See CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER
KILMARTIN & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING
PROCESS (2008), www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf.
346
See AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 343, at § 7.1 (specifying that participation is open
to those with “a direct and material interest” in the substance of a standard). The interest categories
defined by the API notably do not include the general public, environmental organizations, or
worker safety organizations. See id. at § 7.1.1.
347
NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 225.
348
BP was widely criticized for faux news articles trying to minimize the extent of the
disaster. See Rebecca Bratspies, Ballet at Sea: Who Does BP Think It Is Kidding?, INTLAWGRRLS
(June 18, 2010, 11:10 AM), intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/06/ballet-at-sea-who-does-bp-think-itis.html. BP has wisely taken down the link to these articles, but for excerpts, see Cliff Kuang, Can
You Beat BP’s Ridiculous “Reports from the Gulf,” FAST COMPANY (June 15, 2010),
www.fastcompany.com/1660006/like-the-onion-except-disgusting-bp-prs-reports-from-the-gulf.
349
Video, Rep. Joe Barton Apologizes to BP for $20 Billion Claims Fund, YOUTUBE (June
17, 2010), www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gv0siXm2cpc.
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of safe practices, and the agency itself certainly failed in its duty to
protect the public and the environment, the system as a whole is in
desperate need of reform.
Yet, a year after the spill, society seems to have moved on. Unlike
the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, which produced NEPA, or the 1989
Exxon Valdez spill, which produced the Oil Pollution Act, Congress has
so far failed to respond to the BP oil spill with new legislation. The
Department of the Interior has taken many administrative steps to
improve oversight, but without legislative empowerment, it can only do
so much.
The safety of deepwater drilling is an issue that demands attention.
The dangers still exist. The blowout preventers in use today remain
incapable of handling a blowout akin to the BP blast. Industry is only
marginally more capable of responding to a blowout in 2011 than it was
in 2010. MMS’s successor agency is still strapped for expertise and for
cash. Meanwhile, some in Congress seem bent on relaxing existing
standards, rather than strengthening them.
Remember, MMS relied on API for the substance of its regulations
not only because there was a revolving door between the agency and
industry or because the agency identified more with the entities it was
supposed to regulate than the public it was supposed to protect. MMS
also relied on API because its employees had neither the training nor the
resources to keep up with the technological innovations developed in the
private sector. There is no getting around it—insufficiently resourced and
undertrained regulators have little choice but to rely on industry
standards as the basis, and in many cases the substance, of federal
regulation. The cumulative impact of an under-resourced and undersupported regulatory infrastructure is this overreliance on industry and a
concomitant diminishment of government capacity. When regulators set
fewer and fewer of their own regulatory standards, they lose the expertise
necessary to properly assess proposed standards proffered to them by
industry. This loss of capacity in turn further ingrains the revolving door
and increases the potential for conflicts of interest. At the same time, this
overreliance on industry undermines the basic democratic norms of
transparency, rationality, and accountability.
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